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WHO’S IN CHARGE OF GLOBAL FINANCE?
MICHAEL S. BARR*
ABSTRACT
The global financial crisis caused widespread harm not just to the finan-
cial system, but also to millions of households and businesses and to the global
economy. The crisis revealed substantive, fundamental weaknesses in global
financial regulation and raised serious questions about whether national
regulators and the international financial regulatory system could ever be up to
the task of overseeing global finance. This Article analyzes post-crisis reforms
with two questions in mind: First, how can we build an effective international
financial architecture with more than one architect? Second, can we build a
system that is legitimate and accountable? The Article suggests areas for further
substantive and procedural reform.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent financial crisis, which roiled the globe beginning in
September 2008, nearly decimated global financial markets and in
fact devastated the real economy of the United States and Europe,
with concomitant global harm. The worst crisis since the Great De-
pression, the 2008 crisis laid bare widespread, unchecked risk-taking
by financial institutions and a nearly endemic, decade-long failure
by domestic regulators. The consequences of this excess and com-
placency were dire: millions of households lost their jobs, homes,
and savings; businesses shuttered globally; and entire economies lost
years of growth. Even today, households continue to struggle, and
post-crisis recessions continue to hamper the growth of major world
economies.
An even deeper, more enduring crisis was averted only by the swift
intervention of political leaders, central banks, and other regulators
around the globe, and by significant injections of taxpayer funds into
failing financial institutions. Six years later, it is worth reflecting on the
procedural and substantive qualities of the pre-crisis regulatory order
that permitted this recession to occur and asking whether the new
system of global regulation that has emerged since 2008 will ultimately
serve the global real economy any more effectively.
The 2008 crisis exposed fundamental weaknesses—both procedural
and substantive—in the international financial regulatory architecture.
The Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund,
World Bank, and World Trade Organization) were never really equipped
to deal with the growing complexity, breadth, and size of the global
financial system, and instead left rulemaking and supervision largely to
the domestic arena. The cross-border rules that were developed—
essentially by national regulators and the international standard-setting
bodies that took root in this global institutional lacuna in the 1980s—
proved woefully ineffective. Despite strategies to increase the account-
ability and legitimacy of these hybrid standard-setting bodies,1 the rules
failed substantively, and overwhelmingly. Global finance, and a “soft-
law” architecture left unchecked by a decades-long regulatory race to
the bottom, proved weak in the face of global financial institutions and
crushed the real economy.
1. See generally Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from
Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15 (2006) (describing the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as a
nascent, albeit imperfect, template for more legitimate and accountable rulemaking by global
regulatory networks).
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The failure of the pre-crisis regulatory architecture to manage the
financial system at a global level raises two fundamental questions:
First, how can we best build a substantively more effective international
financial architecture with more than one architect? And second, how
can we foster a global regulatory architecture that is legitimate and
accountable—one that reflects our most basic values?
The rubric of global administrative law (GAL) provides a useful
framework for thinking about how to answer these questions.2 Specifi-
cally, it provides a way of thinking about how we might embed in the
international regulatory architecture procedural values that are consis-
tent with the normative justifications for this architecture.3 At the most
basic level, we want global institutions that are effective—meaning that
they establish norms that are treated by national actors as obligations,
that there are systems in place to monitor compliance with these
obligations, and that these obligations are enforced.4 Effective global
institutions will help produce rules and other mechanisms that work at
a substantive level and that can prevent the significant harm the
financial system can do to the real economy when it fails.5 We also need
global institutions that are legitimate, in the sense that the decision-
making criteria and processes they use are seen as normatively correct,
and in the sense that the outcomes these mechanisms produce sub-
stantively respond to the public’s interests and values.6 Finally, we
ought to demand accountability. At its most basic level, the interna-
tional system requires accountability of its organs to national govern-
2. See Benedict Kingsbury et al., Foreword: Global Governance as Administration—National and
Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 5 (2005)
(defining global administrative law as comprising “the legal mechanisms, principles, and prac-
tices, along with supporting social understandings, that promote or otherwise affect the accountabil-
ity of global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring these bodies meet adequate standards
of transparency, consultation, participation, rationality, and legality, and by providing effective
review of the rules and decisions these bodies make.”).
3. See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 15, 44-52 (2005) (outlining several possible normative foundations for global administra-
tive law and the different procedural values they might implicate).
4. See Michael Reisman, The Concept and Functions of Soft Law in International Politics, in 1 ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF JUDGE TASLIM OLAWALE ELIAS 135, 135 (Emmanuel G. Bello & Bola A. Ajibola eds.,
1992).
5. See Barr & Miller, supra note 1, at 21-23 (making a substantive case for the Basel
Committee’s work on international capital standards as necessary to “coordinate supervision to
avoid strategic games by multinational firms and races to the bottom on forbearance”).
6. For a case study of how legitimization mechanisms might operate nationally and interna-
tionally, see generally id.
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ments, but global administrative law suggests a deeper commitment
to public accountability, as through, for example, transparency, public
engagement in decision-making, and initiatives to embed global rule-
making in national processes of public accountability, such as notice-
and-comment rule-making.7
There is important interplay between these values. Even where an
institution lacks formal accountability to nations through treaty autho-
rization, for instance, robust GAL mechanisms (for example, strong
forms of due process and review, or high levels of responsiveness to
notice-and-comment rulemaking) nevertheless might foster a sense of
legitimacy, increase the substantive efficacy of outputs, and encourage
adoption by state or private-sector actors.8 Conversely, an organization
might represent an unusually broad set of interests but have difficulty
producing effective rules widely adopted by national actors. An array of
subsidiary values, such as transparency, can also contribute to institu-
tional legitimacy and accountability.9 On an institution-by-institution
basis, the configuration of these values—the degree to which each
value is embedded in the procedures and underlying structure of an
international organization (IO)—is often highly variable, particularly
when measured against institutional mission. Assessing the extent to
which the international financial regulatory architecture “embodies” a
set of democratic values thus requires an understanding of what the
different institutional actors are designed to do, the sources of their
authority, how they might relate to one another, and the type of
lawmaking in which they are engaged.
This Article traces the evolution of the international financial regula-
tory architecture and evaluates each phase of this evolution in terms of
institutional efficacy, legitimacy, and accountability. It begins with a
brief analysis of two key pre-crisis phases in the development of our
7. For a case study of how accountability mechanisms might operate nationally and interna-
tionally, see generally id.
8. Benedict Kingsbury & Lorenzo Casini, Global Administrative Law Dimensions of International
Organizations Law, 6 INT’L ORGS. L. REV. 319, 354 (2009) (“Where the norm-generation or
norm-acceptance is only shakily related to the will of states, a relevant factor for outsiders in
deciding what weight to give to the norm may be the ways in which it was produced, that is
adherence to standards of publicness and desiderata of GAL.”).
9. Megan Donaldson & Benedict Kingsbury, The Adoption of Transparency Policies in Global
Governance Institutions: Justifications, Effects, and Implications, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 119, 121
(2013) (“[T]he adoption and progressive modification and refinement of transparency policies
exemplify, and contribute to, a broader evolution of public-regarding procedural norms within
governance institutions.”).
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current global financial architecture: the birth of the Bretton Woods
institutions and the rise of the so-called “networks”—the international
standard-setting bodies (ISSBs), such as the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision and International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions (IOSCO) that first began to develop cross-border rules in the
1980s.
The Article then examines the emerging post-crisis regulatory
framework. In this third phase, contradictory trends have emerged:
the international financial order is more political and more inclusive,
and at the same time, its norms have hardened. Although this harden-
ing means minimum standards have become more difficult to avoid,
in some sense races to the top have replaced races to the bottom (at
least for the moment), and nations have reasserted their authority to
raise standards unilaterally within their own countries and to apply—
aggressively—these standards extraterritorially. In this third phase,
the Group of Twenty (G-20) nations take center stage as the world’s
economic and financial decision-makers, and the Financial Stability
Board (FSB) becomes the platform through which the macrofinancial
blueprints of the G-20 are implemented, in part by directing and
coordinating the work of the standard-setting bodies. The Article
then explores the interactions between these bodies and the older
Bretton Woods and standard-setting institutions. Finally, the Article
assesses the merits of the current regulatory order and identifies key
reforms aimed at strengthening the efficacy, legitimacy, and account-
ability of this new system before concluding with some brief thoughts
about the prospect for—and the necessity of—continued reforms over
the next decade.
On a substantive level, global reform efforts to date have made the
financial system safer, perhaps significantly so, but there remain real
questions about whether the financial system is safe enough. Much of
the reform agenda is still a work in progress, from capital standards to
regulation of derivatives and other financial markets, to the mecha-
nisms necessary to wind down immense cross-border firms that get into
financial distress. Amnesia about the causes and consequences of the
breakdown of the financial system may slow or even reverse reforms
taken to date, just when we need to be pushing harder to complete the
task. The next misunderstood financial innovation, asset boom, in-
crease in leverage, or explosion in hot money may find the world still
globally mis-coordinated and unprepared. That is why the stakes are so
high for getting the international financial architecture right.
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATORY ARCHITECTURE PRIOR TO
THE 2007-2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS
A. Phase I: The Bretton Woods System
Today’s financial architecture is rooted in the post-World War II
economic order, one embodied in the three principal institutions that
emerged from the Bretton Woods conference in 1944:10 the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF),11 the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (now part of the World Bank Group),12 and
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT; now adminis-
tered by the World Trade Organization (WTO)),13 as well as (although
much less central in practice) the United Nations Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC).14 In many ways, the creation of these institutions
was a reaction to the financial crises of the 1930s and the pre-war
fragmentation of the global political and economic order.15 In the
pre-war decade, the Great Depression led many nations to turn inward,
away from global trade, and to erect protectionist barriers in the hopes
of reenergizing ailing domestic economies.16
The Bretton Woods attendees embraced a liberal world-trading
ideal, one that received its intellectual force from the work of British
economist John Maynard Keynes.17 The agreements that resulted,
largely shaped by the United States and Britain, identified several key
objectives for these new liberal transnational bodies—stabilization,
reconstruction, and investment-driven growth18—and forcefully pushed
10. For a comprehensive account of the Bretton Woods institutions, see generally
A.I. MacBean and P.N. Snowden, International Institutions in Trade and Finance, in 18 STUDIES IN
ECONOMICS (Charles Carter ed., 1987).
11. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401,
2 U.N.T.S. 39, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf [hereinafter
IMF Articles of Agreement].
12. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/
library/treaties/14/14-01/reconstruction-bank.xml [hereinafter IBRD Articles of Agreement].
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf [hereinafter GATT].
14. U.N. Charter art. 7, para. 1; id. arts. 61-72.
15. See W.M. SCAMMELL, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY SINCE 1945, at 9-14 (2d ed. 1983).
16. See id. at 39.
17. See id. at 13, 15.
18. See id. at 14; see also IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 11; IBRD Articles of
Agreement, supra note 12; GATT, supra note 13; Joseph E. Stiglitz, The World Bank at the Millenium,
109 ECON. J. F577, F577 (1999) (describing the narrow missions of each Bretton Woods
institution).
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against the protectionist policies of the pre-war decade that had
curtailed growth and promoted economic fragmentation.19 In the
immediate post-war era, the IMF and the World Bank set about
implementing this liberal world-trading ideal, working to develop a
level global playing field by rebuilding European economies devastated
by years of turmoil and to jumpstart those less developed economies
newly emerging from long periods of colonization.20
Despite the initial promise of these new institutions, their flaws—
both procedural and substantive—became apparent. First, both the
IMF and World Bank (and later the WTO) reflected a significant bias
toward the large economies of the West and away from smaller,
developing, or middle-income nations—a bias with important ramifica-
tions for transnational accountability and legitimacy. Second, the imme-
diate objectives of the Bretton Woods institutions, although ambi-
tiously focused on post-war economic stabilization and growth, did not
yet include the regulation or supervision of financial markets and
institutions across borders.
The Bretton Woods institutions were designed for efficacy and their
legitimacy was taken for granted—at least in the West and at least
initially. They were rooted in hard-law treaty regimes,21 and they bore
the imprimatur and authority of the major Western economies that
had emerged victorious from war. For these nations, at the zenith of
their power in the post-war era, the IMF and World Bank were paragons
of accountability and legitimacy. Via their disproportionate funding
contributions and global influence, Western nations could exert direct
and decisive control over the operations of the World Bank, IMF, and
liberal trading order. For smaller, less-developed nations, the nesting
of these institutions within the fabric of the United Nations held out at
least the promise for accountability.
Yet a crisis of legitimacy came to the fore as the decades passed. The
IMF and World Bank in theory “each represent 184 countries who
19. See SCAMMELL, supra note 15, at 14.
20. The persistence of this ideal remains evident even decades later in the World Trade
Organization (WTO), created in 1995, and the ongoing proliferation of regional and bilateral
free trade agreements.
21. See, e.g., IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 11; IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra
note 12; GATT, supra note 13; see also Joseph J. Norton, NIFA-II or ‘Bretton Woods-II’?: The G-20
(Leaders) Summit Process on Managing Global Financial Markets and the World Economy—Quo Vadis?,
11 J. BANKING REG. 261, 263 (2010) (describing the Bretton Woods system as “a ‘rule-based’
post-War economic and monetary ‘system’ based on international treaties, formal international
institutions and meaningful international collaboration”).
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collectively fund and run each organization.”22 In reality, however,
“most of these countries have little say over either organization.”23
Instead, a “small number of economically powerful countries run the
institutions.”24 Further exacerbating these national (and regional)
discrepancies in institutional power are powerful special interests
seeking contracts (in the case of the World Bank) or business-friendly
“policies and interventions” (in the case of the IMF).25 Even non-
governmental organizations lobbying these institutions reveal a bias
toward the interests of wealthy countries.26 Taken together, these
biases make it nearly impossible for smaller, less economically powerful
nations to influence global economic, fiscal, and monetary policy27—an
accountability deficit that redounds to even graver concerns about
institutional legitimacy on a transnational basis.
These concerns were compounded by the initial narrow scope of the
Bretton Woods institutions. At least until the 1970s and 1980s, the
World Bank and IMF offered the only real framework for thinking
about financial regulation on a global basis—and yet financial regula-
tion, particularly on a global, cross-border basis, occupied an ancillary
position to the more central stabilization and development objectives
of these multinational institutions.28 Otherwise, financial regulation
22. NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS 190 (2006).
23. Id.
24. Id. For an account of why these procedural inequities exist, see Edward S. Mason and
Robert E. Asher, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETTON WOODS 3-5 (1973), arguing that “neither the
Bretton Woods delegates nor anyone else foresaw how rapidly the colonial world would disinte-
grate and what this disintegration would do to the organization of the Fund and the Bank and
their relations with their membership.” Id. at 3. Furthermore, “insofar as the Bretton Woods
delegates considered the question specifically, they saw no reason to distinguish those policies
relating to trade, payments, and capital flows that were considered to be favorable to the growth
and prosperity of the developed countries.” Id. at 4. Overall, Mason and Asher argue, “[T]he
distinction between developed and less developed and between north and south . . . had scarcely
swum into the ken of postwar planners.” Id.
25. See WOODS, supra note 22, at 190-91 (describing how, behind the powerful countries, “line
up powerful companies who stand to gain or lose from decisions”); see also Stiglitz, supra note 18, at
F582-F585 (documenting the disproportionate role special interests play in shaping the agendas
of the World Bank).
26. WOODS, supra note 22, at 191.
27. Id. (describing the procedural hurdles a country like Rwanda would need to overcome in
order to successfully press a hypothetical concern about debt relief at the IMF).
28. International dialogue on banking regulation, for instance, only emerged informally in
the 1950s, with central bankers using the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) as a platform
for cross-border harmonization. See SCAMMELL, supra note 15, at 114. Higher-level dialogue did not
emerge until the 1960s, largely coincidentally and in the shadow of more formalized participation
in IMF operations by what would become the Group of Ten (G-10) nations. See Norton, supra
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was relegated to the domestic arena.
Although the liberal economic ideals of Bretton Woods were em-
braced at the national level with zeal in the post-war decades, primarily
through national treatment regimes that lowered entry barriers so that
foreign and domestic firms could compete on even ground, many
countries also enacted some form of special-dispensation and special-
control regimes.29 Even without these deviations from national treat-
ment, domestic regimes on their own could not create level playing
fields internationally. Thus, even as individual nations embraced eco-
nomic liberalization, the global financial regulatory order remained
fragmented.
The IMF and World Bank, meanwhile, did (and could do) little to
contend with this persistent regulatory atomization, focused as they
were on catalyzing domestic fiscal and monetary reforms, and not
on creating global rules of the game on a cross-border basis. In the
1970s, the traditional macroeconomic, fiscal, and monetary func-
tions of this post-war order also experienced massive upheaval, with the
United States shifting away from the gold standard in 1971, the
subsequent collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange in
1973, and the transition to a system of floating exchange rates there-
after.30 At least partly in response to this turmoil, the privatization of
the global economic system increased dramatically in the subsequent
decades, as did global financial integration, with banks significantly
expanding their international financing role (and balance sheets)
relative to the public sector.31
note 21, at 265-66 (tracing the G-10 and the cross-border conversations on banking regulation it
subsequently facilitated to the oversight by G-10 finance ministers and central bankers of the
IMF’s General Arrangement on Borrowing).
29. Although the Bretton Woods era was one marked by the fragmentation of global
prudential regulation, some commentators trace the roots of ‘global administrative law’ to the
national treatment and mutual recognition strategies developed by domestic regulators strug-
gling with the absence of uniform, cross-border rules. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 3, at 21
(characterizing as a form of global administrative law the development by national regulators, “on
a bilateral basis, [of] arrangements for mutual recognition of national regulatory standards or
conformity procedures and other forms of regulatory coordination, such as regulatory equiva-
lence determinations”).
30. See generally David T. Llewellyn, The International Monetary System Since 1972: Structural
Change and Financial Innovation, in PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL MONEY, 1972-85, at 14 (Michael
Posner ed., 1985) (describing the reasons for the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early
1970s and the policy reforms undertaken in response to this crisis).
31. See id. at 31-34 (describing the privatization and financial integration of the global
economic system after the “collapse” of the Bretton Woods system in 1972, both of which trends
resulted in widespread pressure for new financial regulatory bodies).
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As a consequence of these shifting roles and responsibilities in the
international economic system, a sense emerged in the early 1980s, first
in the banking sector and then elsewhere, that the Bretton Woods
framework was insufficient to the task of modern, global finance.32 In
particular, national regulators began to worry that continued regula-
tory fragmentation left the global financial system susceptible to cross-
border races to the bottom and widespread regulatory arbitrage.33 To
guard against these concerns, a new consensus took shape—one aimed
at the development of substantive global regulatory frameworks and
uniform cross-border rules.
B. Phase II: Rise of the Networks
The growing pressure for cross-border financial rules in the 1970s
and 1980s did not result in an expansion of the Bretton Woods in-
stitutions to include a treaty-based “World Financial Organization.”34
Instead, the Bretton Woods institutions largely shifted their focus to
macroeconomic and monetary policy in the developing world,35 leav-
ing national regulators and private market participants to develop an
array of informal global networks aimed at the creation of common
cross-border rules for discrete aspects of the global financial system.36
These networks ranged from private bodies, like the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)37 and International Account-
ing Standards Board (IASB),38 to more procedurally complex, govern-
ment-affiliated bodies staffed by national regulators, such as the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS or Basel Committee),39
32. Id.
33. See Barr & Miller, supra note 1, at 21-23.
34. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), for instance, contained a carve
out that left the prudential regulation of financial institutions to national authorities. See General
Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex on Financial Services § 2(a), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S.
183, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/uragreements/gats.pdf.
35. See SCAMMELL, supra note 15, at 165-78.
36. See CHRIS BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM 99-102 (2014) (detailing the origins of the soft law
system of informal global financial regulatory networks).
37. About ISDA, ISDA, http://www2.isda.org/about-isda/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
38. IFRS FOUND. & INT’L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE DO
(2014), available at http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Documents/WhoWeAre_JAN-2014_
ENG.PDF.
39. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, A BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE BASEL COMMITTEE (2013), available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf.
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IOSCO,40 and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors
(IAIS).41
On one end of the spectrum, global networks were driven by private
interests but given a measure of authority and the patina of legitimacy
by public bodies. ISDA, for instance, developed an entirely private
contractual regime for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives transactions
via its master agreement and credit-support annex. ISDA agreements
are ubiquitous in OTC transactions, and thus represent a significant
and critical dimension of cross-border financial regulation.42 IASB,
meanwhile, is a private body comprised of industry accounting experts
and developed to oversee the design and promulgation of inter-
national financial-reporting standards. These standards are then en-
shrined by the European Union in its financial regulatory infra-
structure43 and are also now acceptable to the United States for certain
cross-border transactions.44
Further along the spectrum, networks like BCBS, IOSCO, and IAIS
emerged as hybrid bodies that assembled central bank, securities, and
insurance regulators, respectively, to develop industry standards on a
global, cross-border basis.45 Largely speaking, they reflect the persis-
tent and dominant role of national authorities in directing financial
rulemaking,46 while permitting the informal development of common
regulatory approaches, standards, and principles on a transnational
level.47 In part because of the continued role of national authorities in
setting financial regulatory policy, these networks are predominantly
40. About IOSCO, IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
41. About the IAIS, IAIS, http://www.iaisweb.org/About-the-IAIS-28 (last visited Apr. 28,
2014).
42. It is estimated that the ISDA Master Agreement is “one of the most used forms . . . of
financial contract in the world.” CLIFFORD CHANCE, THE ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT 1 (2012),
available at http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2012/04/the_isda_
master_agreementfromheretoeternity.html.
43. See EUR. FIN. REPORTING ADVISORY GRP., THE EU ENDORSEMENT STATUS REPORT (2014),
available at http://www.efrag.org/WebSites/UploadFolder/1/CMS/Files/Endorsement%20
status%20report/EFRAG_Endorsement_Status_Report_12_March_2014.pdf.
44. For an overview of Europe’s embrace of IASB standards, see IFRS in Europe—Background
Information, DELOITTE, http://www.iasplus.com/en/resources/ifrs-topics/europe (last visited
May 11, 2014).
45. See Barr & Miller, supra note 1, at 16-17. For an alternative account of Basel II, see
DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL (2008) (arguing that a “simpler and more eclectic
international arrangement would be preferable to Basel II.”).
46. Barr & Miller, supra note 1, at 21-23.
47. See id. at 17.
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“soft-law”48 bodies—they lack legal personality, issue largely non-
binding standards,49 and permit significant variations in implementa-
tion across jurisdictions.50 Nevertheless, because these bodies bear the
imprimatur of national authority, there is at least some expectation
that member nations will implement some version of the standards
they promulgate.51
Although these hybrid, standard-setting networks represented an
important evolution beyond the Bretton Woods system, they also raised
significant concerns about their own accountability and legitimacy.
Among other things, they were criticized for technocratic cultures
that were unresponsive to domestic constituencies;52 for organizational
secretiveness and lack of transparency;53 for limited memberships that
excluded many less-developed nations and reinforced the economic
hegemony of developed Western nations;54 for distorting domestic
policy;55 and for privileging industry insiders and experts over average
48. See Reisman, supra note 4, at 135 (defining soft law functionally as law that is soft along
one or more of the three axes integral to lawmaking: “policy statements couched in the normative
mood, expectations of authority, and communications of control intention”).
49. See id. (defining lawmaking expansively to include soft law and those “processes in which
expectations of authority and communications about intentions of control are generated and
mobilized to sustain certain policy formulations that are designed to affect human behaviour”).
50. See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 63-64 (2012).
51. See Barr & Miller, supra note 1, at 21-23; see also Kingsbury et al., supra note 3, at 21 (“[The
Basel Committee is an example of] transnational networks [that are] characterized by the absence
of a binding formal decisionmaking structure and the dominance of informal cooperation among
state regulators . . . The agreements [produced by Basel] are non-binding in legal form but can be
highly effective.”).
52. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of
Global Government Networks, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 159, 164 (2004) (warning of “unelected
regulators . . . who share a common functional outlook on the world but who do not respond to
the social, economic and political concerns of ordinary citizens”).
53. See David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration,
5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 547, 569-72 (2005) (noting that, at least early on, the hybrid networks largely kept
their internal deliberations secret).
54. See Slaughter, supra note 52, at 169 (“A final problem is the way in which government
networks either replicate or even magnify asymmetries of power in the existing international
system.”).
55. See id. at 166-67 (describing the “[h]armonization” agendas of many global financial
networks and the ways in which they supplant national policy with “uniform global standards”).
But see Zaring, supra note 53 at 600-02 (questioning the traditional account of U.S. hegemony
within the hybrid networks, and arguing that, while there may not be adequate representation for
developing nations, nor is there U.S. “unilateralism” in any meaningful way).
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global citizens in their decision-making processes.56
In response to these concerns, the networks responded with varying
degrees of success. Their efforts to improve legitimacy and accountabil-
ity at both the domestic and international levels represented important
first steps in the nascent development of a global administrative law.57
To improve accountability and legitimacy with respect to non-
Western nations, most of the hybrid networks broadened their mem-
bership and enhanced consultation with non-Western nations and
regions. IAIS and IOSCO, for instance, adopted more universal mem-
bership models,58 expanding their representation well beyond the
cloistered set of Western economies responsible for their formation.59
Whereas IOSCO was narrowly “trans-American” at its founding in 1983,
representing only eleven member states,60 its membership now in-
cludes securities regulators from more than 100 nations, with a largely
representative board.61 Similarly, IAIS has expanded since its forma-
tion in 1994 to a membership of more than 300, including more than
100 national insurance regulators as well as other IOs, ranging from the
European Commission to the World Bank.62 Like IOSCO, IAIS’s
executive committee is also regionally representative.63
Unfortunately, this broader membership helped limit the effective-
ness of these bodies. In the decades leading up to the financial
crisis—with enormous failures in investment banks like Lehman
Brothers and insurance conglomerates like the American International
Group—IOSCO and IAIS were largely confined to hortatory pro-
nouncements and relatively feeble measures aimed at standardized
disclosures.64
56. Slaughter, supra note 52, at 169 (noting that the result of opaque decision-making
processes “is to advantage ‘experts and enthusiasts’, the two groups outside government that have
the greatest incentives and desire to participate in governance processes but who are not
representative of the larger polity”).
57. See generally Barr & Miller, supra note 1 (describing BCBS as a nascent, albeit imperfect,
template for more legitimate and accountable global regulatory networks).
58. Although some of the membership expansion for IOSCO and IAIS occurred post-
crisis, at the prompting of the G-20 leadership, both organizations also undertook membership
expansions of some sort in the pre-crisis era.
59. See PABLO IGLESIAS-RODRIGUEZ, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF FINANCIAL REGULATORS 322-27
(2013) (detailing the formation, membership policies, and growth of IOSCO and IAIS).
60. Id. at 322.
61. Id. at 332.
62. Id. at 325-26.
63. Id. at 334-35.
64. See BRUMMER, supra note 50, at 78-79 (describing the “modest” and “meager” legislative
track records of IOSCO and IAIS, respectively); see also Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., Political
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The Basel Committee, meanwhile, largely eschewed expansion of its
membership, which was traditionally “limited to the governors of the
central banks of the Group of Ten (G-10) countries and Switzerland.”65
Not until after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 did BCBS invite other
nations to join, and even now “its membership remains . . . limited,
with only 27 members.”66 Instead, the committee relied on other
mechanisms to promote accountability and legitimacy beyond the G-10
nations, implementing consultations with non-G-10 regional and cen-
tral bankers and generally working to increase participation in BCBS
decision-making by other developed countries.67 For instance, “[c]en-
tral bankers formed regional groups to share information about super-
vision and to coordinate in providing input into the formation of
global capital standards,” and representatives from developing coun-
tries participated in the creation of core supervisory principles in 1997
and in the development of the new Basel Accord in 1999.68
Of all the hybrid networks, the Basel Committee also adopted the
most procedurally sophisticated mechanisms for international notice-
and-comment decision-making.69 For instance, its Basel II capital stan-
dards went through multiple consultative iterations prior to finaliza-
tion, with the committee receiving hundreds of comment letters at
each procedural juncture, largely from industry groups, governments,
academics, and other IOs.70 The committee also “issued background
papers to inform the public about its thinking on key issues, and held
workshops with banks and other firms.”71 From start to finish, this
deliberative process lasted five years and included two full rounds of
consultation.72 Ultimately, these deliberations were relatively “respon-
sive to suggestions made during the notice-and-comment process.
There were real changes in the proposed standards relating to a wide
variety of areas . . . .”73
Despite these efforts to address the accountability and legitimacy of
the hybrid networks at an international level, concerns still remained,
Science Research on International Law: The State of the Field, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 47, 78-79 (2012)
(describing the tradeoffs of more universal memberships—particularly as to enforcement).
65. IGLESIAS-RODRIGUEZ, supra note 59, at 320.
66. Id. at 321.
67. See Barr & Miller, supra note 1, at 27-28.
68. Id. at 27.
69. Id. at 24-27.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 24.
72. Id. at 24-27.
73. Id. at 26.
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both about the discrepancy in memberships across the networks and
the disproportionate organizational influence still wielded by the devel-
oped Western nations.74 Furthermore, to the extent that the notice-and-
comment process employed by BCBS in the development of the Basel
II framework increased organizational transparency, critics worried
about a concomitant increase in susceptibility to capture by industry
elites.75
To address accountability and legitimacy concerns at the national
level, regulators tethered the standards promulgated by the hybrid
networks to domestic procedures, including notice-and-comment rule-
making.76 In the case of the Basel II framework, this tethering per-
mitted G-10 economies such as the United States and Europe to
carefully tailor the capital rules promulgated by BCBS to their own
domestic-banking landscape, while preserving a significant degree of
commonality across jurisdictions.77 Even in emerging economies such
as China and India, where national regulators opted not to adopt the
Basel II standards, national processes still facilitated an important
balance between the need for common cross-border rules and domes-
tic policy preferences.78 Both India and China, for instance, continued
to abide by Basel I rules with a commitment to gradually move toward
implementation of Basel II’s Pillar II.79 Sometimes the nesting of Basel
capital standards (whether tacit or explicit) in the accession agree-
ments, lending conditions, and policy prescriptions of the WTO, IMF,
74. See Eric Helleiner & Tony Porter, Making Transnational Networks More Accountable, in
RE-DEFINING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 14, 17 (Dialogue on Globalization ed., 2009) (“The uneven
geographical expansion across the different standard setters is striking. So too is the fact that
membership has generally been expanded to include only the largest or most systematically
significant countries . . . More voice within the networks needs to be given to them to ensure that
there is no longer such a stark division between insiders and outsiders, between rule-makers and
ruler-takers.”). But see Zaring, supra note 53, at 597-600 (challenging the “democracy deficit” view
of the hybrid networks).
75. See Slaughter, supra note 52, at 165 (“[T]ransparency can make the network even more
accessible to sectoral interest pressures, leading to ‘over-politicization’ in the form of distorted
representation of specific domestic or international preferences.”).
76. For a detailed description of this tethering process in the United States, see Barr & Miller,
supra note 1, at 28-35 (describing Basel II notice-and-comment rulemaking by U.S. banking
regulators, the important national deviations from the accord that this process produced,
important disagreements among regulators within the United States, and the involvement of
Congress in shaping Basel II outcomes domestically). For a description of tethering in Europe, see
id. at 35-39. For the same in the developing world, see id. at 39-41.
77. Id. at 28-39.
78. Id. at 39-41.
79. Id.
WHO’S IN CHARGE OF GLOBAL FINANCE
2014] 985
and World Bank made adoption difficult to resist—thus raising impor-
tant legitimacy concerns in countries not involved in development of
the rules. Nevertheless, this “coerced” adoption represented a signifi-
cant improvement in the accountability and legitimacy of domestic
banking regulations in nondemocratic nations (or in countries where
reformers had long battled entrenched financial interests).80
Taken together, these national efforts to tether global networks to
existing domestic processes represented important steps to improve
the accountability of hybrid bodies like BCBS, IOSCO, and IAIS.
Although these procedures could not fully eliminate important con-
cerns about the legitimacy of these global standard-setting institutions,
they at least began to align global process more closely with the set of
expectations we might have for domestic democratic institutions.
In the wake of the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s, and partly in
response to persistent concerns about the legitimacy, accountability,
and continued atomization of the hybrid networks, the Group of
Seven (G-7) nations moved to create a new international financial
architecture, including the Financial Stability Forum (FSF).81 The FSF
was envisioned as a platform for coordinating the largely decentralized
work of the hybrid networks, including the Basel Committee, IOSCO,
IASB, and IAIS, and for enhancing integration between these bodies
and the IMF, World Bank, and OECD, as well as G-7 finance ministers,
central bankers, and financial regulatory authorities.82
The design of the FSF reflected concerns about the persistent
atomization of international financial regulation despite increasingly
integrated global financial markets. Significant authority for the devel-
opment of financial rules still rested with national regulators, and the
mandates of the various international standard-setting bodies, as de-
scribed above, were limited to discrete, narrow components of the
global financial system (for example, bank capital standards or securi-
ties activity). By bringing together all of the G-7 organizations and
80. Id. at 43 (“While not without significant concerns about legitimacy, the Basel process can
serve as a counterweight to domestic deficits in accountability and legitimacy . . . The charge of a
‘democracy deficit’ among international institutions . . . rests on an assumption that domestic
institutions can better protect the interests of citizens; however, in many countries this is simply
not the case. If there is no domestic democracy to defer to, international institutions may enhance
democratic reforms.”).
81. For an analysis of the Asian crisis and an early proposal for global institutional reform, see
generally BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE (1999). For
a brief history of the FSF, see G.A. Walker, International Financial Instability and the Financial Stability
Board, 47 INT’L. LAW. 1, 2-5 (2013).
82. Id.
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authorities with a stake in the development of a more consistent and
integrated set of cross-border rules, both nationally and internation-
ally, it was hoped that the FSF could overcome the perils of decentraliza-
tion that marked the rise of the networks and rendered a swift,
coordinated global response to crisis nearly impossible.83
With these broader concerns in mind, the G-7 tasked the FSF with
the development of international prudential “best practices.”84 These
best practices were culled from existing regulatory practices by G-7
nations. National adoption of these best practices, primarily by those
countries excluded from FSF membership, was to be promoted on a
global basis. Because these non-G-7 countries also suffered under-
representation in the international bodies assembled by the FSF, as
described above, this extraterritorial mission raised significant con-
cerns for global legitimacy and accountability.85
The narrow membership of the FSF was by design, however, and
represented a purposeful balancing of legitimacy and accountability
concerns against the need for efficacy. A smaller group of relatively
similar nations, the G-7 thought, could better promulgate and enforce
a common set of global rules.86 Indeed, the formation of the FSF by the
G-7 reflected a conscious rejection of a broader, more inclusive frame-
work for global financial coordination put forth by the Group of
Twenty-Two (G-22) nations in 1998.87 This G-22-led body, the Financial
Sector Policy Forum, would have included key emerging economies in
its membership but otherwise would have advanced the same mission
of coordination as the FSF.88 Over time, a handful of non-G-7 econo-
mies were invited to join the FSF, including Australia, Hong Kong,
the Netherlands, and Singapore, and the FSF frequently consulted with
non-member developing nations, but its membership otherwise ex-
cluded larger, emerging economies like China, India, Brazil, and South
Africa.89
Ultimately, the creation of the FSF did little to impose order on the
international financial system or to strengthen the work of the interna-




86. See DOMENICO LOMBARDI, BROOKINGS INST., THE GOVERNANCE OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY
BOARD 4-5 (2011).
87. See id. at 4.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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of long-term U.S. support.90 Thus, oversight of the global financial
system still rested primarily with the networks and their nascent efforts
to enhance legitimacy and accountability. But as the 2008 financial
crisis laid bare, accountability and legitimacy matter little if global
regulatory bodies cannot also produce substantively effective regula-
tory outputs. The crisis revealed a system that, whatever its procedural
merits, had permitted too little capital and too much risky activity, and
allowed too many systemically important institutions to escape its reach
or capacity altogether. Not only were financial institutions unable to
absorb or withstand the crisis when it hit, but the global networks were
revealed as woefully inadequate supervisors, almost entirely unable to
monitor, prevent, or respond to the decade-long build up of the unsafe
systemic risk and leverage levels that catalyzed the crisis.91
Reforms were swift in the making. The crisis almost immediately
provoked a systematic, substantive rethinking of the rules governing
global finance—as well as a significant procedural rethinking of the
overarching global regulatory architecture.
III. POST-CRISIS REFORMS
Shortly after the financial crisis hit full bore in the United States,
global leaders convened in Washington, D.C., in November 2008 to
discuss substantive and procedural reforms necessary to stabilize the
global financial system. In a symbolic and significant break with history,
and largely at the urging of the United States and Timothy Geithner,
who would soon become its Treasury Secretary, this global response
was coordinated by the political leadership of the G-20 nations, and not
by the technocratic, independent central bankers of the narrower
group of Western clubs that had overseen the global economic and
monetary order in the pre-crisis decades (the G-7 and the Group of
Eight (G-8) nations). The development of the FSB, coupled with the
increased role of the G-20 in establishing minimum global financial
policy, has led to a global regulatory environment quite different
from the decentralized, informal world of the hybrid, standard-setting
bodies. Procedurally, the development of these twin institutions has
effected important shifts in the accountability, legitimacy, and efficacy
90. See Andrew Baker, Mandate, Accountability and Decision-Making Issues to Be Faced by the
Financial Stability Board, in THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD 19, 19 (Stephany Griffith-Jones, Eric
Helleiner & Ngaire Woods eds., 2010).
91. See BRUMMER, supra note 50, at 213-33 (detailing the gaps and lapses in the international
financial regulatory architecture that contributed to the global financial crisis).
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of the international financial architecture—and these shifts have, in
turn, shaped the development of new, more muscular substantive rules
of the game.
A. The G-20
The post-crisis elevation of the G-20 as the primary agenda-setting
body for international financial and economic policy represents a
significant national expansion of the global financial architecture
beyond the pre-crisis era and a much stronger recognition of the
growing role of emerging economies in the international financial
order, as well as the increased linkages between these economies and
the developed world.92 Formed in the wake of the Asian financial
collapse of 1999 and the coordinated, cross-border response de-
manded by that crisis, the G-20 membership includes most of the
world’s major emerging economies (Brazil, India, and China, along
with Argentina, Australia, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South
Korea, Turkey, and the European Union).93 All told, its membership
“represents more than 60 percent of the world’s population,” and
accounts for “more than 80 percent” of global GDP—a remarkable, if
still imperfect expansion of institutional legitimacy beyond the G-7 and
G-8.94
In another break with the pre-crisis order, the G-20 nations were
represented in Washington, D.C., by their political leadership, with
independent central bankers in some respects having to share the
global stage, for the first time, with higher-profile, politically account-
able finance ministers and heads of state.95 This politicization immedi-
ately vested the G-20 with more national legitimacy and accountability
than its predecessors, composed as they were of central bankers from
the G-7 and G-8, in addition to substantially enhancing its global
authority. Consistent with this increase in legitimacy, accountability,
and authority, however, the stakes were also much higher: the quality
and effectiveness of the G-20’s new cross-border architecture—both
substantively and procedurally—would inevitably be measured against
the credibility of the global political leadership.
Meeting in Washington, D.C., the G-20 nations quickly agreed on a
92. See id. at 70-72.
93. Id.
94. Edwin M. Truman, The G-20 and International Financial Institution Governance 2 (Peterson
Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 10-13, 2010).
95. See BRUMMER, supra note 50, at 193.
WHO’S IN CHARGE OF GLOBAL FINANCE
2014] 989
blueprint for reform designed to dramatically strengthen cross-border
financial rules, close critical gaps in the pre-crisis architecture, and
significantly enhance global regulatory cooperation.96 Substantively,
the G-20 leadership agreed to focus on broad areas of reform: mitigat-
ing the procyclicality in financial regulation; realigning global account-
ing standards; strengthening derivatives markets; reviewing executive-
compensation practices; and developing more effective regulatory
strategies for systemically important institutions.97 Procedurally, the
reforms in Washington, D.C. included a reworking of the Bretton
Woods institutions to reflect better the shifting weight of the financial
system toward emerging nations and a plan to revitalize the FSF as the
coordinating body for these reform efforts.98
At its next summit, in London in 2009, the G-20 announced the
result of these procedural commitments: not a mere broadening of the
FSF, but its wholesale transformation into a more formal international
body with the capacity to develop, coordinate, and implement the
G-20’s substantive blueprint for reform: the FSB.99 At the time, U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner championed the FSB as a
“fourth pillar” of the global economic order, indicating an ambition to
place the FSB alongside the IMF, World Bank, and WTO as a hard-law
institution with a strong, formal mandate backed by the full political
authority of its member states.100 By the Pittsburgh summit in Septem-
ber 2009, the impact of the FSB was evident in the announcement of a
much more detailed substantive reform agenda, including specific
global approaches to OTC derivatives, capital, and systemically impor-
tant financial institutions (SIFIs).101 In Pittsburgh, the G-20 also an-
nounced that it would become the primary platform for international
economic policy, thus officially replacing the G-8 in this role.102
96. See Statement, G-20 Leaders, Washington, D.C. Summit—Leaders’ Statement (Nov. 15,




99. See Statement, G-20 Leaders, London Summit—Leaders’ Statement (Apr. 2, 2009),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pdf/g20_040209.pdf.
100. Timothy Geithner, U.S. Treasury Secretary, Press Briefing on the G-20 Meetings
(Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Press-Briefing-by-Treasury-
Secretary-Geithner-on-the-G20-Meetings.
101. See Statement, G-20 Leaders, Pittsburgh Summit—Leaders’ Statement (Sept. 25,
2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/
pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf.
102. Id.
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By the Toronto summit in June 2010, the focus of the G-20 had
shifted to long-term recovery, but the leadership nevertheless reached
an important agreement on the principle that the costs of failure
should be recovered from financial institutions (although the precise
mechanism for such recovery—including proposals for a tax on finan-
cial institutions—was left unresolved).103 At both the Seoul and Cannes
summits (in November 2010 and 2011, respectively), the leadership
emphasized the need for more robust surveillance mechanisms glob-
ally to better monitor the implementation of reform and identified the
need for a firmer institutional foundation for the FSB.104 These recom-
mendations were also addressed at the Los Cabos summit in June of
2012, with the leadership agreeing that the FSB should become a Swiss
association and enter a multiyear funding arrangement with the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS).105 At the most recent summit, in
Russia in 2013, focus has remained primarily on encouraging eco-
nomic growth and maintaining the pace of ongoing financial-sector
reforms.106
B. The Financial Stability Board
A decade after the formation of the FSF, in the midst of an even more
severe financial crisis that affected the core of the financial system in
the United States and Europe, G-20 leaders meeting in Washington,
D.C. began to rethink the global financial architecture, a rethinking
that included a continuing leadership role for the FSF, but insisted that
its membership be expanded to include representatives from key
emerging and middle-income economies.107 The 2009 creation of the
FSB delivered on this demand, with the remaining G-20 members,
Spain, and the European Commission added to the existing member-
103. See Statement, G-20 Leaders, Toronto Summit—Leaders’ Statement (June 27, 2010),
available at http://www.oecd.org/g20/meetings/toronto/g20-declaration.pdf.
104. See Statement, G-20 Leaders, Seoul Summit—Leaders’ Statement (Nov. 12, 2010),
available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/G20COMMUN1110.pdf; State-
ment, G-20 Leaders, Cannes Summit—Leaders’ Statement (Nov. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Cannes
Statement], available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-declaration-111104-en.
html.
105. See Statement, G-20 Leaders, Los Cabos Summit—Leaders’ Statement (June 19,
2012), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/
131069.pdf.
106. See Statement, G-20 Leaders, St. Petersburg Summit—Leaders’ Statement (Sept. 6,
2013), available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/Saint_Petersburg_Declaration_ENG.pdf.
107. See Statement, supra note 96.
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ship of the FSF.108 At the same time, the G-20 insisted that the
international standard-setting bodies also expand their membership, a
mandate with which most bodies swiftly complied.109
In addition to this expanded membership, the FSB was also given
a broader mandate than the FSF. Beyond merely coordinating the
work of the international standard-setting bodies, as did the FSF, it was
tasked with the development, implementation, and oversight of super-
visory and regulatory policies for the global financial system—precisely
the mandate that the Bretton Woods institutions lacked and that the
hybrid networks advanced only nominally.110
The FSB is designed to advance this mission of global financial
stability through five principal mechanisms.111 First, the FSB prepares
independent reports on issues of global importance as identified by the
G-20.112 Second, the FSB oversees the policy-development functions of
the international standard-setting bodies.113 This oversight mechanism
is designed to improve overall institutional accountability, with the
Basel Committee, IOSCO, and others required to periodically report to
the FSB,114 and the FSB is empowered to conduct so-called “joint
strategic reviews” of the work undertaken by these bodies.115 Third, the
FSB is responsible for ensuring global compliance with international
financial standards—particularly as to offshore, nonconforming juris-
dictions.116 Fourth, the FSB undertakes peer reviews on a country-by-
country and regional basis as part of a more centralized and formal
effort to monitor regulatory compliance and implementation on a
transnational basis.117 Finally, in conjunction with the IMF, the FSB is
charged with the detection of emerging financial turmoil and the
108. See Statement, supra note 99; see also Press Release, Fin. Stability Forum, Financial
Stability Forum re-established as the Financial Stability Board (Apr. 2, 2009), available at https://
www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_090402b.pdf. For a detailed overview of FSB gover-
nance, see Stavros Gadinis, The Financial Stability Board: The New Politics of International Financial
Regulation, 48 TEX. INT’L L. J. 157, 164-68 (2013); see also LOMBARDI, supra note 86.
109. See Leaders’ Statement, supra note 99; see also supra Part II.B.
110. Financial Stability Board Charter art. 1 (2012) [hereinafter FSB Charter].
111. See FSB Charter art. 2; see also LOMBARDI, supra note 86 at 5-8 (comprehensively
summarizing these mechanisms).
112. Id. art. 2.
113. Id. art. 2.
114. Id. art. 5(2).
115. Id. art. 2(1)(e).
116. Id. Annex B (identifying the Expert Group on Non-cooperative Jurisdictions as a key
ad-hoc working group); see also LOMBARDI, supra note 86, at 7-8.
117. See FSB Charter art. 2.
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provision of “early warnings” to global leaders, with the FSB largely
taking responsibility for financial indicators and the IMF asserting
responsibility over economic and monetary movements.118
The work of the FSB is governed by its plenary, “the central organ of
the FSB and the one in which political appointees . . . have the most
distinct presence.”119 The plenary consists of the senior-most officials
from each represented nation’s financial regulatory agencies, central
bank, and finance ministries, along with the chairs of each member
international standard-setting body (for example, IOSCO, IASB) and
international organization (for example, IMF, World Bank).120 The
plenary oversees the work of the FSB and is responsible for adopting
reports and recommendations generated by the organization perform-
ing its mission.121 The plenary also “decides on the membership;
appoints the chairperson; and decides on Charter amendments and on
any other matter.”122
Seats on the plenary are allocated according to, among other things,
the “size of the national economy [and] financial market activity,”123
such that the largest countries, such as China and the United States are
each allocated three seats, with medium-sized countries like Australia
and Mexico each allocated two seats, and smaller countries, including
Argentina and Saudi Arabia, each allocated one seat.124 Plenary decision-
making occurs on a consensus basis,125 a rather arduous and complex
process given that the current membership of the FSB stands at
sixty-four bodies.126
The Plenary also establishes standing committees and working
groups as necessary to support the ongoing work of the FSB.127 Current
committees (as of spring 2014) include the Standing Committee on
Assessment of Vulnerabilities (chaired by Agustı́n Carstens Carstens,
governor of the Bank of Mexico), the Standing Committee on Stan-
dards Implementation (chaired by Ravi Menon, managing director of
118. Id. art. 2(1)(h).
119. Gadinis, supra note 108, at 166.
120. FSB Charter art. 8(1).
121. Id. art. 7.
122. LOMBARDI, supra note 86, at 9; see also FSB Charter art. 7.
123. FSB Charter art. 10.
124. See LOMBARDI, supra note 86, at 10.
125. FSB Charter art. 7(2).
126. See FSB Member Institutions, FIN. STABILITY BD., https://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
about/fsb_members.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2014).
127. FSB Charter art. 11.
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the Monetary Authority of Singapore), the Standing Committee on
Supervisory and Regulatory Cooperation (chaired by Daniel Tarullo,
chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors), and the Stand-
ing Committee on Budget and Resources (chaired by Jens Weidmann,
chairman of Germany’s central bank).128 Article 11 of the Charter
requires that the plenary consider the need for “balanced representa-
tion” in the composition of these committees.129
In addition, the plenary selects the membership of the steering
committee,130 which oversees operations between plenary meetings131
(at least two of which must occur annually).132 Because of this on-
going operational role, the steering committee wields important in-
fluence over FSB decision-making, particularly as FSB membership
has expanded and plenary decision-making becomes more unwieldy
(although the steering committee also undertakes decisions by
consensus).133
Meetings of the plenary and the steering committee are con-
vened by the FSB chair.134 The chair—elected by the plenary for
three-year terms and limited to two terms135—also oversees the FSB’s
secretariat (only a few dozen bureaucrats, most seconded from
other IOs) and secretary general,136 serves as the organization’s
public representative,137 and “take[s] all decisions and act[s] as nec-
essary to achieve the objectives of the FSB in accordance with the
directions given by the Plenary.”138 In this capacity, “the chair
fulfills a fundamental strategic role and shapes much of the orga-
nization.”139 The current chair is the formidable Mark Carney, gover-
nor of the Bank of England and former governor of the Bank of
Canada.
128. See FSB Plenary, Committees and Regional Consultative Groups (RCGs) Membership, FIN.
STABILITY BD., https://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/pac.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2014).
129. FSB Charter art. 11(3).
130. Id. art. 12.
131. Id. art. 13.
132. Id. art. 9.
133. See LOMBARDI, supra note 86, at 10-13.
134. FSB Charter art. 14(3).
135. Id. art. 14(1).
136. Id. art. 14(3).
137. Id. art. 14(4).
138. Id.
139. See LOMBARDI, supra note 86, at 13.
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C. Procedural Reforms
In the wake of the financial crisis, the international financial archi-
tecture changed in four key ways. First, its “soft” law mandates and
institutions became harder, and more formal. Second, global leaders
developed a clearer hierarchy among institutions assigned tasks in the
regulatory system in order to drive reform. Third, international finan-
cial regulation became more political, with greater involvement by
heads of state and finance ministries. Fourth, peer review became a
more important mechanism for enhancing compliance.
1. More Formality
First, the post-crisis institutional reforms hardened the inter-
national regulatory architecture, imbuing it with more formality. Ini-
tially, the FSB lacked independent legal personality and was governed
by a non-binding Charter. However, the G-20 leaders acted quickly
to strengthen the FSB: following the 2011 Cannes summit, the FSB
convened a high-level working group to recommend reforms that
would put it on “enduring organizational footing.”140 Although this
group considered the transformation of the FSB into a multilateral
treaty-based organization, this option was ultimately discarded. Instead,
the working group recommended that the FSB incorporate as a Swiss
association and take steps to increase its financial resources. These
recommendations were adopted first by the FSB Plenary141 and then by
the G-20 itself at the 2012 Los Cabos summit.142 In January 2013, the
FSB formally registered as a Swiss association, based in Basel.143
Despite these institutional reforms, however, the FSB falls short of a
binding, treaty-based regime. Indeed, the FSB’s articles of association
specify that its non-binding Charter still governs all of the organiza-
tion’s policymaking activities.144 The articles also take pains to note:
These activities, including any decisions reached in their con-
text, shall not be binding or give rise to any legal rights or
140. Cannes Statement, supra note 104.
141. FIN. STABILITY BD., REPORT TO THE G20 LOS CABOS SUMMIT ON STRENGTHENING FSB
CAPACITY, RESOURCES AND GOVERNANCE (2012), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.
org/publications/r_120619c.pdf.
142. See Statement, supra note 105.
143. See FIN. STABILITY BD., ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION (2013) [hereinafter FSB ARTICLES OF
ASSOCIATION], available at: http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130128aoa.pdf.
144. Id. art. 10.
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obligations under the present Articles. Members can recuse
themselves at any time from these activities or decision-making
where such activities or decision-making are not consistent with
their legal or policy frameworks.145
Compliance with the articles of association and the Charter thus
remains a “matter of political commitment.”146 Although national
commitment to reform remains at a historical zenith, the possibility of
waning commitment—particularly by the largest financial economies—
remains an area of concern, especially as the FSB has not yet developed
effective mechanisms for the self-censure of its members.147
Furthermore, because the plenary undertakes decision-making by
consensus, it effectively grants large players willing to stand up to an
emerging consensus a kind of veto power over FSB policy.148 Although
in most instances the FSB has nevertheless been able to reach consen-
sus on policy, consensus building can lead to lower standards. More-
over, were FSB peer reviews to reveal national or regional regulatory
deficiencies, it is foreseeable that national resistance to a robust FSB
mandate could increase;149 the resulting recalcitrance of any one G-20
member could torpedo the FSB supervisory and regulatory agenda.
Even aside from concerns about the impact of waning political
commitment on its organizational efficacy, the FSB is hobbled by its
unwieldy decision-making structure. Not only are decisions undertaken
by consensus, but the plenary currently consists of representatives from
145. Id.
146. Shawn Donnelly, Institutional Change at the Top: From the Financial Stability Forum to the
Financial Stability Board, in CRISIS AND CONTROL 261, 265 (Renate Mayntz ed., 2012).
147. See Bessma Momani, The IMF and the FSB: Intractable Political Reality and Organizational
Mismatch, in THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, supra note 90, at 36, 37 (warning of what will happen
when the “G20 honeymoon ends and the skirting of responsibilities returns to the fore,” and
suggesting that “free-rider” problems will persist until the IMF and the FSB clarify how they will
“deal with the intractable problem of self-censure of members”); see also Donnelly, supra note 146,
at 263 (noting that “the unwillingness of the United States to undergo . . . a review of its own
practices” was one of the primary obstacles to improved global financial regulation under the
FSF).
148. See Baker, supra note 90, at 22 (suggesting that the FSB consider revising its consensus-
based decision-making process to prevent single actors from wielding veto power over global
financial policymaking—particularly to the extent that the FSB voices politically unpopular
recommendations).
149. See id. at 21-22 (arguing that the FSB should call out global financial risks but suggesting
that this role may be limited by political pressure from G-20 leaders should the FSB’s peer reviews
reveal national or regional regulatory or market deficiencies).
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sixty-four members.150 Furthermore, the FSB is supported by a limited
secretariat of only several dozen bureaucrats (primarily economists)
and must rely on the BIS for funding.151 In addition to constraining the
institutional capacity of the FSB, these limitations pose potential con-
cerns for global legitimacy by favoring those nations able to finance
domestic cadres of technical and policy advisors and disadvantaging
developing nations with more limited internal capabilities, and thus
less ability to participate in the FSB’s working groups.
These specific operational critiques aside, however, there are good
reasons to be wary of further institutional formality and hardening
while the international regulatory architecture (and the national imple-
mentation of substantive reforms) remains in flux.152 By preserving a
soft-law approach, the G-20 has created in the FSB a body that might
be more flexible and better able to manage the continuing tensions
between national implementation and cross-border rule development
that are playing out on a global level.153 A continuing soft-law approach
might also better accommodate the ongoing refinement of relation-
ships among institutions within the global financial regulatory architec-
ture, with the G-20 preserving the authority to further formalize the
FSB should the long-term governance of the global financial system so
demand.154
2. A Clearer Hierarchy
Second, the post-crisis reforms created a clearer hierarchy of power
within the international financial regulatory architecture. Wielding the
imprimatur of its member nations’ political leadership, the G-20 func-
150. See FIN. STABILITY BD., MEMBERS OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD (2014), available at
https://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/plenary.pdf.
151. FSB ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION art. 7.
152. See Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 64, at 73 (“The choice of soft law does not
necessarily reflect a failure to agree on hard law. Rather, states often favor soft law because it is less
costly to negotiate, more adaptive in the face of uncertainty, and more readily adjusted to facilitate
compromise between actors with differing interests and degrees of power.”); see also C.M. Chinkin,
The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 850
(1989); Reisman, supra note 4, at 139 (“One function of soft law in international law, then, is to
provide negotiators and lawmakers with an alternative tool which supplies a commonly accepted
level of normative guidance yet allows adjustments through time by unilateral initiation . . . It is
appropriate and necessary, given the nature of the international political system. Not every
situation calls for soft law, but some international situations require it.”).
153. See infra Part IV.B.
154. Some commentators argue that the G-20 should also resist institutionalization in order
to preserve its operational flexibility. See Truman, supra note 94, at 17-18.
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tions as an apex agency, announcing strategy at a global level and
charging the FSB with implementation and monitoring.155 The FSB, in
turn, coordinates with the ISSBs, directing their policy work—at least in
theory—and monitoring national implementation of global regulatory
standards.156
In this way, the increasing role of the G-20, coupled with the unique
development of the FSB as a transnetwork body,157 marks an important
shift from the loosely knit, decentralized network of standard-setting
bodies that presided over the global financial regulatory architecture in
the decades immediately preceding the crisis. Theoretically, this archi-
tecture is now more complete. With a single body now responsible for
coordination, policymaking is less atomized and it is harder for con-
cerns to fall between the cracks of narrowly focused standard-setting
bodies.158
Despite the development of a clearer institutional taxonomy, how-
ever, concerns about the relationships between various IOs remain. For
instance, some critics argue that the post-crisis hierarchy begins and
ends with the G-20, which can mandate action by both the FSB and the
standard-setting bodies, while the FSB remains rather limited in its
authority over the Basel Committee, IOSCO, IAIS, IASB, and others.159
At the very least, the relationship between the FSB and these standard-
setting bodies could benefit from more clarity. The FSB is authorized to
review the policymaking work of the ISSBs; similarly, these bodies must
report their activities to the FSB. Nonetheless, the Charter states
somewhat ambiguously that this “process should not undermine the
independence of the standard-setting process but strengthen support
for strong standard-setting by providing a broader accountability frame-
work.” Many commentators note that the FSB functions less as a
centralized authority directing the cluster of regulatory networks it
155. See Gadinis, supra note 108, at 169-75 (describing the policymaking relationship
between the G-20 and the FSB).
156. See id. at 163-64.
157. See LOMBARDI, supra note 86, at 19.
158. Id. (arguing that the FSB’s “multidimensional membership” could “enable it to poten-
tially bridge the gaps resulting from the national and sectoral fragmentation of financial
regulation”).
159. See, e.g., Donnelly, supra note 146, at 268 (“A hierarchical relationship between the
Board and the [Basel] Committee . . . is only theoretical. Instructions for Basel . . . come directly
from the G20, and the Basel Committee’s institutional identity, strength and cohesion are robust.
IOSCO . . . also seems to have a free hand to pursue rule-making and standard development in
ways of its choosing.” (internal citations omitted)).
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ostensibly oversees, and more as an “arena” for coordination160 or a
“membrane” through which its constituents collectively diagnose “sys-
temic financial threats.”161
Even as a “membrane,” however, the FSB directs more activity by the
ISSBs than these critiques allow. Importantly, for instance, these cri-
tiques overlook the role that the FSB plays in informing the specific
regulatory agenda of the G-20. At the Pittsburgh summit in September
2009, the first summit after the establishment of the FSB, the G-20
Leader’s Statement reflected a far more sophisticated substantive
agenda for reform, with detailed principles for derivatives reform (the
centralized clearing and exchange-based trading of OTC derivatives),
capital standards (new liquidity and leverage ratios), and cross-border
resolution mechanisms.162 Thus, even in the absence of clear, direct
relationships between the FSB and the other standard-setting bodies,
the FSB shapes the policy-making work of these subsidiary bodies via its
influence on the G-20’s reform agenda.163
Moreover, because of the significant representation by national
finance ministers within the FSB’s plenary, many of whom also provide
national representation within the G-20, there are significant inter-
locks in authority between the FSB and the G-20 such that any recalci-
trance by the standard-setting bodies can be authoritatively resolved.
The efficacy of the FSB in directing and shaping the work of the
standard-setting bodies is reflected in the board’s success in developing
recommendations for the regulation of global systemically important
financial institutions (G-SIFIs), compensation practices, resolution
mechanisms, shadow banking, and OTC derivatives.164 In the case of
G-SIFIs and OTC derivatives, the FSB composed working groups staffed
in part by ISSB representatives and solicited feedback and recommen-
dations from the ISSBs directly.165 The FSB has also demonstrated its
effectiveness in monitoring policymaking work by the ISSBs, success-
160. See id. (“The Board remains in this sense focused on communication, consensus-
building, coordination and puzzling about the right way to prevent another global crisis, not
about handing out instructions to the ISSBs . . . The FSB is the arena in which this takes place,
rather than a central authority per se.”).
161. LOMBARDI, supra note 86, at 19.
162. Statement, supra note 101.
163. See Gadinis, supra note 108, at 169-75 (describing the various ways in which the FSB and
G-20 interact).
164. See Walker, supra note 81, at 11-28 (providing a comprehensive overview of the FSB’s
reform agenda, including its extensive work with the ISSBs); see also Gadinis, supra note 108,
at 171-73.
165. Gadinis, supra note 108, at 171-73.
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fully overseeing, for instance, IASB and FASB’s efforts to develop
convergent, less pro-cyclical accounting standards and reporting any
hiccups in this effort in detailed reports to the G-20.166
Some commentators have suggested that concerns about the contin-
ued murkiness of the global regulatory hierarchy might also infect the
horizontal relationship between the FSB and the three other pillars of
the global economic order, especially the IMF. The relationship be-
tween the FSB and these other pillars of the global economic order is so
critical in part because of a return by the Bretton Woods institutions to
the task of macroeconomic, monetary, and financial policy in the
developed world—both in managing Europe’s sovereign debt crisis
and conducting peer reviews of national financial sectors in the West as
part of the IMF and World Bank’s Financial Sector Assessment Pro-
gram (FSAP).
Those worried about the relationship between the FSB and the
Bretton Woods institutions point to the substantial organizational
mismatch between the FSB and a more institutionalized body like the
IMF, not only in terms of size and capacity167 but also as to interna-
tional legal status. The Centre for International Governance Innova-
tion has also suggested that “animosity” exists between the IMF and the
FSB as to the joint early-warning exercises both organizations use to
assess emerging risks to the global economy.168 For instance, the IMF
and FSB report the findings from these exercises separately despite the
underlying aim of producing an integrated view of the global economy
across financial, monetary, and macroeconomic indicia.169 Several
commentators have also noted the similarity between the FSB’s peer
review mechanisms and FSAP and suggest that these similarities might
result in mission overlap or operational redundancy.170 They argue
166. Id. at 171 (“This reporting suggests that IASB and FASB do not operate in an
institutional vacuum, as was the case before, but rather under the watchful eye of political actors,
who are eager to see results from these rulemakers.”).
167. See Momani, supra note 147, at 36 (noting the problematic mismatch in size and
organizational capacity between the IMF and the FSB).




170. See Donnelly, supra note 146, at 271; see also Louis W. Pauly, The Financial Stability Board in
Context, in THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, supra note 90, at 13, 17 (“But surely the idea behind
these less-than-binding [peer review] procedures bears a family resemblance to the commitment
already embodied in the IMF, namely mutual accountability for national contributions to systemic
risk. The difference, of course, lies in the legal obligation underpinning Fund surveillance in both
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that this potential for interorganizational tension is concerning be-
cause a strong partnership with the IMF and World Bank is one of the
principal mechanisms by which the FSB can cultivate influence and
legitimacy.171
But these criticisms overlook the structural value of jurisdictional
overlap and competing missions, and the ways in which the FSB can act
as an important informational counterweight to the IMF. For instance,
joint reporting might actually provide a more textured, balanced view
of the global economic order and avoid the groupthink that character-
ized global regulation in the lead up to the most recent financial crisis.
A similar counterweight structure marks the national regulatory land-
scape in the United States, with the Office of Financial Research acting
as the informational counterweight to the domestic prudential regula-
tors, many of which overlooked key systemic risk indicia prior to the
crisis.172 Furthermore, because much of the global regulatory architec-
ture remains in flux, with the G-20 still occupying a crisis-management
role, jurisdictional overlap between the IMF and FSB might actually
help surface important institutional tensions that can inform the
development of a more refined, long-term regulatory architecture.
3. More Political Involvement
Third, the post-crisis regulatory architecture reflects more robust
involvement by the political leadership of the G-20 nations. Whereas
Ben Bernanke and his international counterparts at major central
banks oversaw the development of cross-border regulatory frameworks
in the pre-crisis era, now President Obama, his fellow heads of state,
and their finance ministers are involved alongside the independent
central bankers in directing the global regulatory agenda. At the most
basic level, this direct political involvement lends the international
financial architecture more national legitimacy, rooting it directly in
domestic democratic processes. It also bolsters regulatory accountabil-
ity by shifting authority from insulated bureaucrats to elected political
its national and multilateral settings, in the number of states involved, and in the nature of the
preparatory staff work that would amount to more than just technical advice to a ‘process.’”).
171. See Donnelly, supra note 146, at 271 (“Indeed, while all FSB members are expected to
undertake peer reviews, the Board sees the IMF in particular as crucial for ensuring standard
implementation in non-FSB-member countries. This [in] turn is viewed as crucial to managing
emergent crises in the future.”) (internal citations omitted).
172. For an early vision of an entity similar to the OFR being able to serve as a counterweight
to the regulatory agencies, see Ross Levine, The Sentinel: Improving the Governance of Financial
Regulation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 2009).
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officials directly responsive (in theory) to the will of their domestic
constituencies.
The increased role of the political leadership in the international
financial regulatory architecture, however, has not come at the ex-
pense of independent agencies, with enhanced authority granted to
central banks (and other independent domestic regulators) in the
United Kingdom, United States, and the European Union.173 Thus,
while the political leadership does exercise more significant authority
over the global policymaking agenda, independent agencies have
retained or enhanced their important policymaking roles, too. In the
United States, for instance, Treasury serves as Chair of the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC),174 but the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors has been given significant supervisory and regulatory
authority over the largest bank and non-bank financial institutions.175
At a global level, the division of responsibility across these two func-
tions, although uncertain, helps mediate accountability concerns, as
well as the long-held value of independence in financial regulation.
Indeed, to the extent accountability is vital to domestic and global
administrative law, independence has, historically, been seen as equally
vital to domestic and international financial regulation. There is, of
course, tension between these two values, but at least in the current
state of uncertainty, this tension has produced strong regulatory out-
comes both nationally and internationally.176
It is not yet clear, however, that the magnified role of the G-20
political leadership in the global regulatory sphere addresses concerns
related to global legitimacy. For instance, because at least part of the
FSB’s mission is extraterritorial (that is, fostering compliance among
non-cooperating, non-member jurisdictions),177 it may be necessary to
broaden the board’s membership even further (although the FSB has
already established six regional consultative groups to facilitate out-
reach among underrepresented and non-member countries).178 Even
173. In the United Kingdom, for instance, significant regulatory authority has been given
back to the Bank of England, see Financial Services Act, 2012, c. 21 (Eng.), while in Europe, the
European Central Bank has played a leading role in the development of a new, post-crisis
regulatory framework, see Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 127(6), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 103.
174. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203
§ 111 (2010).
175. See, e.g., id. §§ 604, 605, 606, 616.
176. See infra Part IV.B.
177. FSB Charter, Annex B; see also LOMBARDI, supra note 86, at 7-8.
178. See LOMBARDI, supra note 86, at 16-17.
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1002 [Vol. 45
as the FSB’s membership expands, moreover, concerns might still
remain about whether all of the voices within this expanded member-
ship are heard.179 This concern is particularly acute given the geo-
graphic bias of the FSB toward Western developed nations. All of
the major international financial organizations are headquartered in
Europe or the United States, making the relative cost of doing business
much higher for non-Western nations, many of which already lack
strong representation at these organizations.
Commentators have also raised concerns about institutional capture.
For instance, FSB’s Charter only provides for consultation with private
sector parties (in addition to non-member authorities), although in the
parlance of international law, private sector may encompass civil society
organizations as well.180 The increased role of the G-20 political leader-
ship might also increase opportunities for capture at the national level
to the extent that political leaders are less insulated from domestic
political pressures than their central banker and bureaucratic counter-
parts. Some of these concerns can be addressed via consultations
with civil society groups, formal notice-and-comment processes, and
the promulgation (perhaps) of less complex standards,181 although
concerns about capture will naturally intensify as the FSB continues to
gain global legitimacy and influence.
4. Stronger Peer Review
Finally, the post-crisis financial architecture reflects a new approach
to efficacy in cross-border rulemaking. Former U.S. Treasury Secretary
Timothy Geithner described the basic premise underlying this new
approach at the G-20’s Pittsburgh Summit in 2009:
[T]he basic strategy is a simple strategy. You get countries to
agree to raise the standards, to commit to a level playing field,
and then you have a huge interest in all countries in holding
each other accountable to hold their institutions to that same
standard, because they all know that if anybody tries to compete
179. See Eric Helleiner, Governance Issues Relating to the FSB and International Standards, in THE
FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, supra note 90, at 28 (“[T]he inclusion of new countries at the decision
making table needs to be followed by measures that allow these countries to make their voices
count within the FSB.”).
180. FSB Charter art. 3 (“In the development of the FSB’s medium- and long-term strategic
plans, principles, standards and guidance, the FSB will consult widely amongst its Members and
with other stakeholders including private sector and non-member authorities.”).
181. See Helleiner, supra note 179, at 30-31.
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by lowering those standards, it would be adverse to their
interests.182
The principal mechanism by which a level playing field and intergov-
ernmental accountability are achieved is peer review—a process that
“produces social pressures, which in turn shapes judgments as to
whether or not to conform to a given standard.”183
For instance, the FSB conditions membership on assent to regular
peer reviews. The FSB has developed comprehensive peer review
mechanisms, including for both thematic and country peer reviews.
Thematic reviews examine the implementation of standards across the
FSB membership and are designed to promote stronger cross-border
uniformity and efficacy. FSB country reviews, meanwhile, evaluate
compliance with IMF-World Bank FSAP and Reports on the Obser-
vance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) recommendations, as well as
any other supervisory and prudential concerns relevant to the FSB’s
core mission.
The IMF-World Bank FSAP process has itself become more robust,
particularly with the United States agreeing to peer review in 2009 for
the first time after years of refusal. Indeed, the role of the IMF and
World Bank has changed significantly in the post-crisis era, with these
institutions now playing a much more substantial role in the developed
world. The IMF and World Bank have played crucial roles both in the
sovereign debt crises roiling across the European continent, including
in Italy, Greece, Cyprus, and Ireland, and—via FSAP and ROSC—
conducting more peer reviews of the major Western economies.184 In
another important step toward increased efficacy, peer review mecha-
nisms now also increasingly focus on institutions and not just on
nations or other international bodies, such as in the case of U.S.-E.U.
exercises on the comparability of risk-based capital requirements185
and European Central Bank (ECB) stress tests.186 Thus, even in the
absence of a hard-law, treaty-based regime, peer review mechanisms
can enhance the efficacy of the global financial architecture by increas-
182. Geithner, supra note 100.
183. LOMBARDI, supra note 86, at 6.
184. See The IMF and Europe, IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/europe.htm
(last visited May 11, 2014).
185. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REGULATORY CONSISTENCY ASSESSMENT PRO-
GRAMME (RCAP) (2013), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs256.pdf.
186. See Comprehensive Assessment, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ssm/
assessment/html/index.en.html (last visited May 11, 2014).
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ing transnational social pressure and giving more weight to the obliga-
tions promulgated by the FSB and the ISSBs.
D. Substantive Outcomes
Concerns about accountability and legitimacy aside, the post-crisis
reforms to the global financial regulatory architecture represent a
significant procedural improvement over the prior era of decentral-
ized, hybrid networks. Furthermore, this new, “harder,” more political,
more hierarchical regulatory architecture has also achieved some early
substantive successes, producing rules far more stringent than those
produced in the pre-crisis climate of global races to the bottom and
cross-border regulatory arbitrage.187 Capital rules are stronger. Deriva-
tives regulation is tougher. Structural reforms are being put in place.
Yet the project is incomplete, and significant risks remain in the system.
1. Global Capital Rules
Almost immediately in the wake of the crisis, the political leadership
began to address the pre-crisis weaknesses in the global bank capital
rules. Basel II.5, which targeted risks from off-balance sheet assets and
market risks, was developed early in 2009 and quickly adopted by the
major economies.188 By the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh in September
2009, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner had assembled a
consensus in favor of higher capital standards. By late 2010, the Basel
Committee promulgated its Basel III capital standards,189 which are
187. For a comprehensive overview of post-crisis international reforms, see generally Finan-
cial Regulation and U.S. Competitiveness Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, Sub. Comm. on
Oversights and Investigations (Mar. 5, 2014) (statement of Michael S. Barr); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNT-
ABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-261, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REFORMS (2014). For a critique of the focus
by commentators and academics on the procedural dimensions of reform versus its substantive
outcomes, see Truman, supra note 94, at 15 (“[Many] criticisms of the G-20 focus on form over
substance, which is unfortunate. For the restoration of health and subsequent vitality of the global
economy and financial system, substance is what matters.”).
188. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, ENHANCEMENTS TO
THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf; BASEL COMM.
ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, GUIDELINES FOR COMPUTING CAPITAL FOR
INCREMENTAL RISK IN THE TRADING BOOK (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs159.pdf.
189. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS para. 2 (rev. 2011) [hereinafter BASEL III CAPITAL
PROPOSAL], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf. The first draft of the proposal was
released in December 2010. Press Release, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Basel III Rules
Text and Results of the Quantitative Impact Study Issued by the Basel Committee (Dec. 16, 2010),
available at http://www.bis.org/press/p101216.htm.
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being implemented gradually across all Basel Committee member
jurisdictions with the deadline for full implementation set for Janu-
ary 1, 2019.190
Basel III requires financial institutions to hold much higher-quality
capital than its predecessor: the minimum total regulatory capital
ratio remains at 8% of risk-weighted assets,191 but the revised rules
require banks to hold Tier 1 capital in an amount no less than 6% of
risk-weighted assets.192 Basel III also introduces a new Common Equity
Tier 1 requirement, under which banks must hold at least 4.5% of
risk-weighted assets in common equity.193 Basel III also reduces the
ability of banks to rely on riskier, less-absorbent forms of regulatory
capital194 and bars banks from including lower-quality Tier 3 instru-
ments in regulatory capital.195 The Basel III changes further require all
firms to hold a countercyclical “capital conservation buffer,” with
dividends, share buybacks, or bonuses limited if Common Equity Tier I
levels are within 2.5 percentage points of the minimum 4.5% Common
Equity Tier 1 level.196
Critically, Basel III also imposes a global non-risk-based leverage
ratio. The leverage ratio requires banks to hold Tier 1 capital equal to
3% of their total exposures197 and is intended to supplement Basel’s
risk-weighted rules. Finally, firms posing the greatest risk to the finan-
cial system are required to hold even higher levels of capital—a “SIFI
surcharge.” All global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) will bear
this surcharge,198 with the most systemically important G-SIBs required
to hold more capital (an additional 2.5% of risk-weighted assets) than
those with less systemic importance.199
190. BASEL III CAPITAL PROPOSAL, supra note 189, Annex 4.
191. Compare BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, INTERNA-
TIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS para. 40 (consolidated ver.
rev. 2006) [hereinafter BASEL II CAPITAL FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs128.pdf, with BASEL III CAPITAL PROPOSAL, supra note 189, para. 50.
192. BASEL III CAPITAL PROPOSAL, supra note 189, para. 50.
193. Id. paras. 48, 50.
194. Id. paras. 87-88.
195. Id. para. 9.
196. Id. paras. 129-32.
197. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III LEVERAGE
RATIO FRAMEWORK AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS (2014), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs270.pdf.
198. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, GLOBAL SYSTEMI-
CALLY IMPORTANT BANKS (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207.pdf.
199. Id.
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Even as some jurisdictions rightly adopt more stringent capital rules
than those required under the Basel III approach,200 however, more
work is still needed to strengthen the global capital framework, at least
for the largest firms. Risk-based capital requirements need to be made
more transparent and comparable on a cross-border and institution-by-
institution basis, and better substitutes need to be developed for both
the discredited credit rating agencies and the internal models of the
regulated institutions. Additionally, both the global leverage ratio and
the SIFI surcharge are simply too low, if either is to serve as an effective
buffer against asset implosions or liquidity runs or weigh effectively
against any “too big to fail” subsidies. Moreover, as the countercyclical
capital buffer is left to national economic circumstances and discre-
tion, national regulators should commit to economic triggers that
would increase capital requirements and use other methods to reduce
leverage under specified circumstances. Furthermore, stress testing,
which has served a critical role in bolstering capital oversight in the
United States, is in need of further refinement, more transparency,
and greater predictability. In Europe, stress testing has not worked to
date, with the European Central Bank’s new stress tests an essential
signal of whether the Bank will have credibility as the eurozone’s bank
supervisor.
2. Derivatives and Wholesale Funding Markets
At the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit, G-20 leaders also committed to
significant reforms in the OTC derivatives market, with all standardized
OTC derivatives to be moved onto exchange-trading platforms and
centrally cleared, and non-cleared derivatives to be penalized with
higher capital and margin requirements.201 The leaders also agreed
that all OTC derivative trades—including those that remained purely
bilateral—should be reported to trade information repositories.202 In
2011, the G-20 further agreed that non-cleared derivatives contracts
should be subject to margin requirements.203 In key FSB member
jurisdictions, the statutory regimes for central clearing, exchange-
based trading, and trade reporting are now in place, with the frame-
works for margin requirements lagging behind.204 Regulatory imple-
200. See infra Part III.C.
201. See Statement, supra note 101.
202. Id.
203. See Cannes Statement, supra note 104.
204. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 187, at 27-30.
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mentation has lagged significantly behind legislation, however, with
rules still not even proposed in most jurisdictions as of April 2014,
particularly in Asia.205 In addition, persistent technical, liability, and
jurisdictional problems with trade reporting and trade repositories
have compromised the necessity of these functions in providing regula-
tors and market participants with a comprehensive informational view
of global derivatives markets.206
Furthermore, global rules for repo and other short-term funding
markets remain far less developed, with most jurisdictions only in the
earliest phases of proposing rules. More regulatory attention is needed
on the issue of hot money, which continues to pose significant risks to
systemic stability, to address weaknesses in foreign currency markets,
and to restore trust and confidence to benchmark global rates like
LIBOR. In sum, much of the plumbing of the financial system is still in
need of reform.207
3. Structural Reform and Resolution
Globally, much work remains to be done in the area of structural
reform and resolution. The United States, United Kingdom, and
European Union have all embraced the need for ringfencing and
stronger horizontal buffers between retail deposit banks and other,
riskier financial functions.208 All three jurisdictions are moving toward
some form of a model that embraces restrictions on transactions
between banks and non-bank affiliates, independent capital for non-
bank functions, and caps on counterparty credit exposures.209 In the
Volcker Rule,210 the United States has adopted the strongest version of
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Fiona Maxwell, Majority of Emir Derivatives Reports Cannot Be Matched, Say
Repositories, RISK (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/news/2335669/majority-of-
emir-derivatives-reports-cannot-be-matched-say-repositories.
207. See Darrell Duffie, Replumbing Our Financial System: Uneven Progress, 9 INT’L J. OF CENTRAL
BANKING 251 (2013).
208. For a high-level visual summary of the structural reforms proposed in the United States,
versus those originally proposed in the United Kingdom (Vickers) and E.U. (Liikanen), see JOSÉ
VIÑALS ET AL., IMF DISCUSSION NOTE, CREATING A SAFER FINANCIAL SYSTEM 15 (2013). For an overview
of the more recent structural reform proposal in the E.U., see European Commission, Structural
Reform of the EU Banking Sector (Press Release IP/14/85, Jan. 29, 2014).
209. Id.
210. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and
Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 12 C.F.R. §§ 44, 248, 351, 17 CFR
§ 255 (2014), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/2013/2013-12-10_notice_dis-a_fr.pdf
(implementing Dodd-Frank Act § 619).
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these reforms, but significant work still remains to be done in all three
jurisdictions as to implementation. It is particularly important, too,
that ringfencing not be viewed as a panacea; structural reform will only
prove effective to the extent it is integrated with broader changes in
supervision, capital, and resolution mechanisms.
Progress on structural reform is also important because of the
linkages between clearer, less risky structures for financial conglomer-
ates and ease of resolution. “Living will” requirements, such as those
adopted in the United States,211 can help ease the process of cross-
border resolution by clarifying lines of authority and aligning business
risk with organizational form, but ultimately, a cross-border mecha-
nism for the resolution of highly complex firms is still necessary.
The United States has developed a “single point of entry” model (the
Orderly Liquidation Authority) that will facilitate the resolution of the
largest financial conglomerates by empowering the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation to act as receiver for the top-tier parent holding
company,212 and in April 2014, Europe officially adopted its Single
Resolution Mechanism,213 which will be administered by the ECB as
part of its new supervisory authority over the continent’s largest banks
and will be funded via contributions from eligible banks, with national
assessments assimilated into a community-wide fund within eight years.
The establishment of a European resolution and funding mechanism
will help break the link between a national government’s fiscal position
and the health of domestic financial institutions—a link that exacer-
bated Europe’s sovereign debt crisis. The crisis found many euro zone
countries unable to support troubled banks, either because the size of
the bank exceeded national GDP, or because public finances proved
too unstable to provide any assistance.214
National implementation of more effective resolution mechanisms
has also been bolstered by the work of the FSB, which in 2011 released a
set of best practices it considers “necessary for an effective resolution
211. See Federal Reserve and FDIC, Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67323 (Nov. 1,
2011); FDIC, Resolution Plans Required for Insured Depository Institutions With $50 Billion or
More in Total Assets, 76 Fed. Reg. 58379 (Sept. 21, 2011).
212. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 174, tit. II.
213. James Kanter, European Parliament Approves Laws on Banking Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 16, 2014, at B8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/business/international/
european-parliament-approves-laws-on-banking-overhaul.html.
214. Andrew Palmer, Show Me the Money, ECONOMIST (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.economist.
com/news/21589070-european-central-bank-becomes-euro-zones-single-banking-supervisor-show-
me-money.
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regime.”215 The FSB is also developing a Resolvability Assessment
Process that will be used to evaluate the feasibility and credibility of
national resolution mechanisms in the event of a G-SIFI failure.216
Despite these significant regulatory advances, however, the orderly
resolution of systemically important, highly complex cross-border firms
will not be feasible without more global cooperation and a comprehen-
sive transnational approach. Fortunately, the G-20 has recognized the
important relationship between structure and resolvability. At the 2013
summit in St. Petersburg the G-20 leadership instructed the FSB, IMF,
and OECD to collaborate in assessing “cross-border consistencies and
global financial stability implications [of structural reforms], taking
into account country-specific circumstances,” and all three bodies are
expected to report on this work at the 2014 summit in Brisbane,
Australia.217
Overall, the substantive global rules developed and implemented in
the post-crisis era are far more robust than their pre-crisis counter-
parts and provide far fewer opportunities for regulatory arbitrage
and evasion. Nonetheless, significant work remains, as does the under-
lying question of whether the current international financial regu-
latory architecture is sufficient to the task of a truly sound global
financial system. Achieving more organizational simplicity and clarity
in the financial sector may also require new approaches altogether.
For example, the United States put in place a soft cap (10% of total
financial liabilities) on the global liabilities of U.S. firms; once the cap
is hit, these firms cannot merge with or acquire other financial institu-
tions. A tax on the wholesale liabilities of financial firms would further
reinforce safety in the system. While the Obama administration pro-
posed such a tax,218 it never gained traction in the United States. The
IMF endorsed the idea in 2010,219 but it has received little attention
since. A liability tax imposed by the major economies would both
215. FIN. STABILITY BD., KEY ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION REGIMES FOR FINANCIAL IN-
STITUTIONS 1 (2011), available at https://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104
cc.pdf.
216. FIN. STABILITY BD., ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY FOR THE KEY ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE RESO-
LUTION REGIMES FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 14 (2013), available at https://www.financialstability
board.org/publications/r_130828.pdf.
217. See Statement, supra note 106, para. 68.
218. See Jackie Calmes, Taxing Banks for the Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2010, at B1, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/15/us/15tax.html?_r0.
219. See Squeezing the Piggy-banks, ECONOMIST (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.economist.com/
node/15948811.
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help constrain the size and complexity of financial conglomerates and
perhaps help to offset the costs to society of future failures.
E. National Strategies
Even as the post-crisis intervention of the G-20 in the global finan-
cial architecture has resulted in a harder, more formal system, with a
clearer hierarchy, more political accountability, and a stronger frame-
work for generating, implementing, and monitoring cross-border rule-
making, variations across domestic regulatory regimes have prolifer-
ated, with the leading economies engaged in an ambitious transnational
strategy of regulatory competition. Unlike in the pre-crisis era, how-
ever, national variation and international regulatory competition to
date have not resulted in widespread races to the bottom and cross-
border regulatory arbitrage. Instead, the post-crisis national regulatory
strategies have largely resulted in upward deviations from an already
more robust global regulatory floor—a global race to the top.
This new financial architecture means that national variation alone
(that is, the tailoring of global standards to individual domestic land-
scapes) can encourage global races to the top. It also rewards first
movers on a national basis, particularly as to the extraterritorial applica-
tion of domestic rules. One country can take the lead in developing
more robust extraterritorial standards than those required on a global
level, and by doing so can effectively push other countries into the
adoption of similarly stringent rules.
For instance, opportunities for national variation have marked the
ongoing development of new structural rules for insured depository
institutions (IDIs).220 The United States, European Union, and
United Kingdom are all pursuing versions of structural reform. Part
of structural reform involves ringfencing, whereby certain activity
remains within a financial conglomerate, but is separated from the
IDI by firewalls—of varying heights. The United Kingdom will likely
ringfence the insured depository functions of a banking group
and take a functional, flexible approach to the activities these ring-
fenced banks may still provide.221 The European Union, meanwhile,
will likely ringfence the riskier activity from other parts of the firm
220. For a high-level visual summary of the original structural reforms proposed in the
United States, versus those proposed in the United Kingdom (Vickers) and E.U. (Liikanen), see
JOSÉ VIÑALS ET AL., supra note 208, at 15.
221. INDEP. COMM’N ON BANKING, FINAL REPORT (2011) [hereinafter VICKERS REPORT].
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and take a relatively flexible approach to activity restrictions.222 In the
United States, which placed relatively strict activity restrictions on IDIs
but permitted them to affiliate broadly with non-bank financial firms
before the crisis, two new regulatory frameworks, both authorized by
the Dodd–Frank Act,223 will further insulate IDIs from risky, non-
banking activity. The Volcker Rule, unlike the European Union and
United Kingdom’s proposals, eschews firewalls in favor of total separa-
tion, with certain proprietary trading functions and significant hedge
fund investments pushed outside of “banking entities” (financial con-
glomerates that include IDIs) entirely.224 The Lincoln Swaps-Pushout
Rule, meanwhile, is expected to erect firewalls between IDIs and
specified derivatives activity.225
To date, the United States has pursued a more stringent approach
to structural reform than have the United Kingdom and European
Union. And, indeed, whereas the United States has already finalized
the Volcker Rule, the passage of structural reform legislation in the
United Kingdom and European Union remains delayed, suggesting
that reforms in these two jurisdictions may grow weaker. Thus, one
account of structural reform would suggest that a bold, muscular
approach by U.S. regulators has failed to spark equivalent reforms
overseas. In this telling, national variation is destructive to uniform,
global rules and even if the race is still upwards, relatively speaking, it
does not yet always arrive at consistent, higher ground.
But this account mistakes national variation for divergence.226 Al-
though the approaches employed by the United States, United King-
dom, and European Union differ in detail, “all accept that universal
banking can be efficient but see the need for it to have structural
safeguards.”227 Thus, even if none of the approaches represent a
222. EUR. COMM’N, HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON REFORMING THE STRUCTURE OF THE EU
BANKING SECTOR, FINAL REPORT (2012) [hereinafter LIIKANEN REPORT].
223. See generally Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 174.
224. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and
Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 12 C.F.R. §§ 44, 248, 351, 17 CFR
§ 255 (2014), http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/2013/2013-12-10_notice_dis-a_fr.pdf (implement-
ing Dodd-Frank Act § 619).
225. See Prohibition Against Federal Assistance to Swaps Entities (Regulation KK), 12 C.F.R.
§ 237 (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-06-10/pdf/2013-13670.pdf
(implementing Dodd-Frank Act § 716).
226. See Michael Barr & John Vickers, Banks Need Far More Structural Reform to Be Safe,
FIN. TIMES (July 21, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e2bc9968-e3e6-11e2-91a3-00144fea
bdc0.html#axzz30KqHs81H.
227. Id.
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perfect strategy, and while they may raise legitimate concerns about
efficacy, there is still functional convergence, with each jurisdiction
concerned with the same underlying set of prudential risks and each
working toward a regulatory model that represents a significant strength-
ening of the pre-crisis order.228
Furthermore, in many other instances, the strategy of social pressure
has resulted in clearer races to the top. In the case of global capital
requirements, for instance, many countries are requiring firms to hold
even more capital than the global minimum set by Basel III. In the
United States, the supplemental leverage ratio for IDIs is set at 6%,
double the Basel III-required leverage ratio, and at 5% at the bank-
holding company level. Even Switzerland, not formally a G-20 nation
and a traditional off-shore banking center, has set tougher require-
ments than required under Basel III standards. For larger banks,
Switzerland set higher capital requirements, up to 19% for the two
largest (UBS and Credit Suisse)—the so-called “Swiss Finish.”229
In addition to regulatory variation across jurisdictions, some coun-
tries—most notably, the United States—have also adopted aggressive
extraterritorial strategies designed to force reform upward on a global
basis. For instance, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors has final-
ized new rules for foreign banking organizations (FBOs) operating in
the United States.230 Under these rules, large FBOs are required to
place non-branch assets under a U.S. intermediate holding company
structure subject to consolidated supervision by the Federal Reserve.231
In many circumstances, FBOs will also now need to meet U.S. capital
and liquidity rules and prudential standards with respect to their U.S.
operations, in addition to the rules they must meet under their home
country’s laws.232
These rules are prudent measures to reduce systemic risk and
improve the safety and soundness of the U.S. financial system. Strong
capital and liquidity rules will make these firms more robust against
failure and less subject to debilitating runs in a crisis. Moreover, they
help to make supervision and resolution of foreign firms operating in
the United States substantially more feasible, if such resolution is
required. In many ways, the rules are consistent with (or better than)
228. Id.
229. Jack Ewing, 2 Swiss Banks Facing Higher Capital Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010, at B9,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/05/business/global/05basel.html.
230. See FRB Enhanced Prudential Standards (Regulation YY), 12 C.F.R. § 252 (2014).
231. See id.
232. See id.
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the principle of national treatment, putting large FBOs and domestic
banking organizations on similar footing. Nevertheless, they have
also engendered significant controversy because of their extraterrito-
rial reach, the potential to reduce the efficiency of the capital and
liquidity allocation of the consolidated firm on a global basis, and the
significant structural reforms they require of firms operating in the
United States that are headquartered beyond U.S. borders.233 It re-
mains to be seen what effect the aggressive approach embodied in
these new rules will have on the regulatory positions of foreign jurisdic-
tions; some fear “retaliation,”234 but similar rulemaking by other juris-
dictions would advance the aim of more effective regulation on a
cross-border basis and should, ideally, contribute to an evolving global
race to the top.
A similar strategy has transpired between the United States and
European Union during the development of domestic cross-border
derivative regimes. The United States moved first, with strong reforms
under the Dodd-Frank Act, followed by the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission (CFTC) releasing a muscular proposed set of rules
with significant extraterritorial reach.235 The rules drew significant
criticism from foreign banking organizations, international swap deal-
ers, and the European Commission, each of which understood the
rules to effectively limit market participants trading with U.S. parties to
U.S. exchanges, in the absence of real reforms elsewhere, thus trigger-
ing significant fears over market fragmentation.236 As the CFTC consid-
ered these concerns and negotiated with the European Commission, it
issued an exemptive order delaying the effective date of the rules for
several months.237 Not until the evening before this exemptive order
233. See, e.g., Louise Bennetts & Arthur S. Long, Fed’s Final Foreign Bank Rule Increases Risk in
Global Banking, American Banker (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/
feds-final-foreign-bank-rule-increases-risk-in-global-banking-1065719-1.html (arguing that the FBO
rule is protectionist and interferes with the efficient allocation of capital on a transnational basis).
234. LOUISE C. BENNETTS & ARTHUR S. LONG, CATO INSTITUTE, THE NEW AUTARKY? HOW U.S.
AND UK DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN BANKING PROPOSALS THREATEN GLOBAL GROWTH 6 (2013).
235. Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act,
17 C.F.R. ch. 1 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-07-12/pdf/2012-16496.
pdf.
236. Douwe Miedema & John O’Donnell, Europe, U.S. Strike Peace on Cross-Border Swap Rules,
REUTERS (July 11, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/07/11/uk-eu-derivatives-idUKBRE
96A0G020130711.
237. Final Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance With Certain Swap Regulations,
78 Fed. Reg. 858 (Jan. 7, 2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/
documents/file/federalregister122112.pdf.
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lapsed were the CFTC and the European Commission able to agree on
a “common path forward.”238
This common-path agreement embraced “equivalence,” whereby the
United States will consider European market participants and ex-
changes in compliance with European rules also in compliance with
U.S. rules.239 Although the CFTC, led by then-Chair Gary Gensler, had
resisted an equivalence regime, this agreement did not represent a U.S.
capitulation. Instead, by releasing the stringent set of proposed rules
far before the European Commission acted, the United States was able
to push the European Union toward a similarly stringent regime.240 By
acting first and then leveraging its aggressive rules in transatlantic
negotiations, the CFTC ensured that equivalence would be just that—
actual regulatory parity, and not a code word for regulatory arbitrage,
as it had too often been in the pre-crisis era. Indeed, since the
common-path agreement was inked in July 2013, the CFTC has contin-
ued to interpret the agreement stringently, seeking strong, equivalent
rules from European regulators. This suggests that, even as derivatives
firms relocate to the United Kingdom, this relocation is not simply
déjà vu. Instead, because the U.K. treatment of derivatives is governed
by European regulation, even these relocated firms will not be able to
engage in meaningful cross-border arbitrage—if the European regula-
tors complete the job of reform.
Nevertheless, even as the CFTC’s strategy of extraterritoriality has
resulted in stronger European rules and reduced the potential for
arbitrage, it has also increased transatlantic tensions. Ideally, imple-
mentation of extraterritorial rules would involve closer regulatory
coordination between domestic and foreign jurisdictions—particularly
where, as here, there is a high degree of parallelism between the
European Union and the United States.241 Although the tensions
between the United States and the European Union over cross-border
derivatives rules are not likely to scuttle cooperation over other dimen-
sions of the global reform agenda, the possibility for transnational
enmity and the need for cooperation will both grow as the global
political commitment to reform wanes.
238. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, The European Commission
and the CFTC Reach a Common Path Forward on Derivatives (July 11, 2013), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6640-13.
239. Id.
240. Id. (detailing the joint commitment of the CFTC and European Commission to enact
functionally and substantively analogous rules).
241. See ATLANTIC COUNCIL, THE DANGER OF DIVERGENCE 14-15 (2010).
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In this intermediate period of reform, however, with the G-20 not yet
transitioned from crisis management to long-term governance, it may
make sense for the global leadership to encourage—or at least not
attempt to block—national variation and even national strategies of
extraterritorial application.242 The United States should be permitted
to take an aggressive stance on derivatives, and the European Union
should be permitted the same latitude on executive compensation and
financial taxation. Indeed, the post-crisis experiences with national
variation and extraterritorial strategy to date suggest that the G-20
should avoid the adoption and implementation of rigid, detailed
rulemaking on a cross-border basis and should instead play the role of
shepherd—working through the FSB to produce rigorous, robust
prudential standards;243 correcting downward national deviations but
otherwise encouraging strong domestic regimes that exceed minimum
standards; and intervening where necessary to minimize transnational
tensions.
F. The Prospects for Further Institutional Reform
It is too early to know whether and to what extent the post-crisis
reforms to the global financial architecture will work. The interna-
tional architecture remains an awkwardly constructed work in progress.
Measured by its outputs, the modifications appear to be making the
financial system safer, but there are, nonetheless, many structural and
procedural tensions roiling beneath the surface.
On the one hand, for instance, the dominant role of the G-20
political leadership in setting an agenda for reform and the develop-
ment of the FSB as an international institution with independent legal
status represents a hardening of rulemaking at the global level. On
the other, this political involvement facilitates national variation—
variation that in some instances, as with Basel III implementation, may
lead to global races to the top, and in others, as with derivatives
implementation, may well provoke cross-border tension and compli-
cate regulatory oversight unless further coordination is pursued.
242. For one account of the importance of national experimentation and flexibility in
international financial regulation, see Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation
of Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Rethinking the Basel Architecture 35-38 (Yale Law & Econ.
Research, Paper No. 452, 2013).
243. See Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 64, at 74 (noting that “imprecision, as with non-
binding agreements, can lead to more cooperation . . . .”). For another account of the relation-
ship between ambiguity (i.e. standards) and compliance, see generally Chinkin, supra note 152.
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Although the commitment of the G-20 leadership to continued
reforms remains strong, individual countries have pursued global re-
form with markedly different strategies. The United States, for in-
stance, has largely pursued an “enact first, negotiate later” strategy to
reform, issuing rules with significant extraterritorial reach in an effort
to increase pressure on other, major economies and magnify its bargain-
ing position on the global stage. Other actors, including the European
Union, have lagged behind the United States by months and even years
on some key elements of reform, while pursuing more aggressive
strategies on executive compensation. Whether this transnational stra-
tegic variation will continue to erupt in cross-border tension and a
reversion to national strategies, or instead will end up fostering stron-
ger global rules, is unclear.
Either way, these tensions stem from an international regulatory
system that lacks a single, authoritative architect. And while it may be
perilous, given systemic flux and uncertainty, to propose new reforms,
modest institutional refinements might nonetheless enhance the long-
term efficacy, legitimacy, and accountability of the current interna-
tional regulatory bodies—including the G-20, FSB, IMF, and standard-
setting bodies.
For instance, further reforms are necessary to enhance the global
legitimacy of the FSB, as well as its national legitimacy within non-
member states. The Regional Consultative Groups (RCGs) represent
an important step toward more robust global legitimacy but do not
fully compensate for the explicitly extraterritorial mission of the FSB.244
Even within the existing membership of the FSB, the United States and
European Union tend to dominate, given the importance of these
financial markets. Exacerbating these concerns is the relatively slow
pace of post-crisis reform in Asia—particularly in China and India—
where the effects of the financial crisis were less acute and domestic
policymakers lack the sense of urgency felt by their European and U.S.
counterparts.245 Reforms aimed at enhancing the legitimacy of the FSB
thus need to elevate the role of non-Western voices in organizational
decision-making and foster more engagement by non-G-20 countries,
but without diluting the key reforms required in the United States and
Europe.
244. See Eric Helleiner, FSB Governance, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE & IMPACT REPORT
2013, at 9-10 (New Rules for Global Finance ed., 2013).
245. See Ignazio Angeloni & Jean Pisani-Ferry, The G20: Characters in Search of an Author 27
(Breugel, Working Paper No. 4, 2012).
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The FSB should still be wary of simple strategies like membership
expansion without concomitant governance reforms. Even with only
sixty-four members, the plenary is unwieldy—achieving the con-
sensus necessary to act will only become more difficult if this mem-
bership grows. IAIS and IOSCO are paradigmatic examples of a more
inclusive membership policy compromising organizational effi-
cacy.246 Before expanding its membership, the FSB should reevaluate
its consensus-driven governance mechanisms. It might also adopt a
more centralized approach to governance, with authority consolidated
in a steering committee, with additional regional representation
requirements.
Overall, the G-20 has signaled its awareness of the need to increase
ownership of the global financial architecture by the major emerging
economies. In 2012, for instance, the G-20 directed reforms to the FSB
steering committee, including “representation from the executive
branch of the ‘G20 Troika’ countries (the previous, existing, and
subsequent G20 chairs) and of the five countries whose financial
sectors were most systemically important.”247 To bind the emerging
economies more firmly to the project of global reform, the FSB might
rotate its meetings, as the G-20 has done since its first meeting in
Washington, D.C. in 2008.
Commentators have suggested that a balance between broader and
continued efficacy could be achieved through some version of the
constituency system used by the IMF and World Bank (although these
institutions, of course, have their own legitimacy concerns).248 In the
case of a consolidated steering committee, this might entail the division
of plenary members into regional blocs, the equitable allocation of
committee seats across these blocs, and the explicit expectation (via
charter amendment) that each committee member represent not only
its own national interests but also the broader interests of its bloc. A
revamped steering committee could also be aligned more closely with
the RCGs, with Committee members required to serve as co-chairs of
the RCGs, thus ensuring that even non-member states have a relatively
246. See BRUMMER, supra note 50, at 78-79.
247. Helleiner, supra note 244, at 11.
248. See id. at 10; see also Angeloni & Pisani-Ferry, supra note 245, at 43 (describing remarks
by former U.K. Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, and WTO head, Pascal Lamy, in favor of a
constituency system at the level of the G-20). But see Truman, supra note 94, at 17 (noting that the
“disadvantage of constituencies is that individual leaders feel constrained by obligations to
represent the consensus of their constituencies and speak and act less freely.”).
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direct channel to the decision-making processes of the FSB.249 In my
judgment, however, these reforms are unlikely to improve the outcome
of decision-making of the FSB. “Representatives” of blocs are more
likely, not less, to “vote” for substantive outcomes that reflect subopti-
mal political jockeying, and the formalization of regional voting blocs
seems likely to result in the further stymieing of reform.
Further reforms are also necessary to enhance the global account-
ability of the FSB and to address concerns about private-sector capture.
For instance, FSB might increase operational transparency, better
publicizing its meetings and other policymaking activities.250 A 2012
Charter modification addressed some of these concerns, mandating
periodic reporting to the G-20 and resulting in the development of a
public website.251 A 2013 civil-society review of FSB operations noted,
however, that the board “still does not release much information to the
general public about its meetings, including those of its Plenary and
the RCGs.”252
Although enhanced disclosure might help accountability, the nar-
row pursuit of transparency might also exacerbate capture. To the
extent that the opaque decision-making processes of the FSB function
as a secret ballot box of sorts, some measure of opacity might disrupt
the influence of private-sector lobbying and enable member officials to
make unpopular but sound decisions. It might also make private-sector
actors less likely to extract promises from member officials by eliminat-
ing any means of evaluating compliance. Increased transparency might
also disproportionately redound to the influence of private-sector
actors to the extent that they possess more technical capacity and
organizational resources to lobby than civil-society organizations.
On balance, though, enhanced transparency would enhance the
legitimacy and accountability of the FSB. The FSB decision-making
process is, in many ways, more complex and opaque than the domestic
regulatory process. On the one hand, the FSB is making the sort of
merits-driven policy judgments that more insulated domestic regula-
tory agencies make. On the other hand, much of its decision-making
resembles the multilateral system of negotiation, coordination, and
compromise that marks more formalized treaty-based regimes. Thus,
even if enhanced transparency cannot directly shape institutional
outcomes, it can help clarify the decision-making processes underlying
249. See Helleiner, supra note 244, at 10 (advocating similar reforms in the Plenary).
250. See id. at 10-11 (describing potential transparency and disclosure reforms).
251. FSB Charter art. 5(1).
252. Helleiner, supra note 244, at 10.
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these outcomes such that domestic rule-making processes can better
anticipate and compensate for these deficiencies.253
To increase transparency, and to strengthen linkages between na-
tional and global process, the FSB should formally adopt—via its
Charter—procedures for notice-and-comment rule-making.254 By devel-
oping structured processes for civil-society and private-sector actors to
review and comment on proposed rules, the FSB would help ease
coordination difficulties between the international and national regula-
tory processes and might also enhance procedural safeguards for
impacted financial institutions. Currently, for instance, the process by
which FSB and the other ISSBs arrive at G-SIFI determinations lacks
robust procedural protections.255 Notice-and-comment rule-making
would extend to institutions affected by these determinations some-
thing akin to due process rights—the sort of rights already built,
for example, into the FSOC’s non-bank SIFI determinations in the
United States.256
At the global level, the FSB might also consider a range of other
governance mechanisms to give more weight to civil-society voices.257
First, it might amend its Charter explicitly to include civil-society
organizations alongside “private sector and non-member authorities”
253. One example of where this process-oriented transparency could be beneficial is in the
case of the Basel III rules capping investments in other financial institutions, mortgage servicing
rights, and deferred tax assets in full against Tier 1 capital. BASEL III CAPITAL PROPOSAL, supra
note 189. Under Basel III, adjustments from any one of these sources may be no more than 10% of
Common Equity Tier 1, and aggregate adjustments from all sources may be no more than 15% of
Common Equity Tier 1. Id. paras. 87-88. Directionally, these rules reflect the on-the-merits policy
judgments of the Basel Committee, and represent a strengthening of the more permissive Basel II
regime. Substantively, however, these rules are still too weak—these assets should not be counted
toward Common Equity Tier 1 capital—a symptom of international negotiation and compromise.
More institutional transparency would likely not improve the quality of these rules—but it would
provide more procedural clarity such that domestic rulemaking could better anticipate and
account for these deficiencies.
254. See also BRUMMER, supra note 50, at 197-98 (describing the G-20 and FSB as laggards in
the area of notice-and-comment rulemaking and other, similar accountability mechanisms).
255. In the past, the FSB has simply published an annual list of G-SIFIs and G-SIBs, using a
relatively rigid methodology developed by the Basel Committee. See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD., 2013
UPDATE OF GROUP OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS (2013), available at https://www.
financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_131111.pdf.
256. Financial Stability Oversight Council, Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation
of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 12 C.F.R. Part 1310 (2012), available at http://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/documents/nonbank%20designations%20-%20final%20rule%20and
%20guidance.pdf.
257. For a discussion of the importance of civil society voices in domestic regulatory controls,
see, for example, Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 601-02 (2005).
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among the parties with which it can consult.258 The Charter might also
be amended to permit civil-society observers—in addition to private-
sector observers—at plenary sessions, when invited by the chair.259
Other commentators have suggested that civil-society organizations
also be allowed to observe and participate in the work of the RCGs.260
And while the 2012 Charter amendments provided for some form of
public consultation,261 the FSB might consider dedicating secretariat
staff to civil-society consultation and outreach. Dedicated secretariat
staff would ensure a more direct link between civil-society groups and
FSB policy-making and might create more parity with private-sector
groups by giving civil-society groups access to in-house technical
expertise.
Reflecting concerns about capture and organizational indepen-
dence, the FSB has also considered—and rejected, at least for now—
the adoption of a membership fee.262 This was a wise decision, as a
membership fee would tie the fiscal status of the board to the political
commitment of the G-20 nations. The lessons of the FSF are instructive
here: resistance from a single nation—in that case, the United States—
can easily torpedo the institutional efficacy of politically dependent
institutions.263 Furthermore, the experience of both the FSF and IASB
suggests that reliance on membership fees requires significant organi-
zational investment in the recovering of fees from members and only
increases opportunities for capture.
Instead, BIS funding might actually provide more long-term viability
for the FSB; the BIS is embedded in the global regulatory architecture
and thus relatively less affected by waning interest in reform from the
G-20 political leadership. At the same time, the FSB should modestly
expand the size of its secretariat and should diversify its staffing both on
a regional basis and across a broader variety of expertise. A larger, more
diversified secretariat would preserve the institutional benefits of a
258. FSB Charter art. 3; see also Helleiner, supra note 244, at 11 (discussing the need for FSB
consultation with civil society groups).
259. See Helleiner, supra note 244.
260. See id.
261. FSB Charter art. 3.
262. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 141, at 3.
263. See Donnelly, supra note 146, at 263 (describing how the prior refusal of the United
States to submit itself to the IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program left the FSF with “very
little to do or room or inclination to grow further institutionally.”). The United States in 2009
agreed to submit itself to the FSAP review and, needless to say, survived the process. See INT’L
MONETARY FUND, UNITED STATES: PUBLICATION OF FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM DOCUMEN-
TATION (2010), available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10247.pdf.
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financial relationship with BIS while improving the FSB’s independent
technical and policymaking capabilities.
Finally, further reforms are also necessary to strengthen FSB’s effi-
cacy, at both the national and international levels. At the national level,
the FSB currently lacks any mechanisms for censuring noncompliant
members (that is, members that fail to implement the standards
promulgated by the FSB directly or through the standard-setting bodies
it oversees).264 One way to enhance national efficacy is to transform
the FSB into a treaty-based regime; however, such a transformation is
unlikely. The FSB’s high-level working group considered such a trans-
formation prior to the Los Cabos Summit in 2012; this approach was
rejected as inappropriate at the time, and perhaps rightly so. A treaty-
based regime would reduce or eliminate the benefits of national
variation and provide opportunities for the financial sector to blud-
geon national regulators into implementing weaker standards.
Different, but related, concerns also militate against the inclusion of
financial regulation in global trade talks, including the addition of
prudential concerns to transatlantic talks between the United States
and European Union over the proposed Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership.265 Squeezing the task of financial reform into
trade talks would make it far easier for reforms to be assimilated into
omnibus negotiations and domestic ratification and traded away in
exchange for resolution of other global concerns.266
Some have suggested that the FSB could be housed formally within
the IMF.267 This would root the FSB within the hard-law, treaty-based
regime of the IMF, with the goal of increasing its accountability and
legitimacy. But the IMF is hardly a bastion of either value. Indeed,
much of the developing world’s critique of the IMF has been focused
on its weighted voting that even after recent governance reforms still
favors the developed world; its remoteness from local civil society or
national mechanisms of accountability; and its insufficient efforts
264. See Helleiner, supra note 244, at 12 (lamenting the FSB’s lack of tools to force
compliance).
265. Michael S. Barr, Keep Financial Regulation Out of US-EU Trade Talks, PROJECT SYNDICATE
(Jul. 29, 2013), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-eu-trade-talks-versus-financial-
regulation-by-michael-s--barr.
266. Id.
267. See Pauly, supra note 170, at 17 (recommending that “member states should let the FSB
do its modest work with its modest staff but then accept the necessity of embedding that work
deeply into a larger collaborative macroeconomic policy arrangement,” and suggesting that the
IMF is the “coordinating institution . . . that fully engages the attention of heads of government,
finance ministers and key legislators”).
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toward becoming a truly transparent body. Moreover, insertion of the
FSB in the IMF would also risk subordinating the financial mission of
the FSB to the more properly macroeconomic and monetary mission of
the IMF. This option also lacks political viability, as the G-20 would lose
direct authority over FSB operations (although G-20 nations do largely
control IMF operations via their significant voting shares).268
A more modest approach might tie noncompliance with FSB policy
standards to loss of membership privileges within FSB.269 Failure to
comply with these standards would jeopardize participation in the
steering committee and other key FSB policymaking bodies.270 Even
this small step toward national efficacy, however, might threaten the
fragile G-20 coalition that undergirds the FSB’s authority. Although the
FSB Charter was “not intended to create any legal rights or obliga-
tions,”271 it, along with the articles of association, does condition mem-
bership on a commitment to national compliance.272 And, short of a
treaty-based sanction regime, the FSB still possesses significant informa-
tional authority over its membership.
Peer reviews can force compliance through interstate political pres-
sure and should not be underestimated as an enforcement tool.
Although more serious concerns might arise if the G-20 political
commitment to reform wanes, the institutional efficacy and influence
of the FSB would best be served by strengthening its peer review
mechanisms and leveraging the interstate pressure that such surveil-
lance generates. As in the case of accountability, a larger, more
independent secretariat and a larger role for the secretary general
would bolster the FSB’s peer review system.273 Indeed, the principal
advantage of registering as a Swiss association is the FSB’s legal au-
thority to hire its own staff. Regardless, the more independent and
purely technical the peer review process becomes, the easier it becomes
268. See Int’l Monetary Fund, IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of
Governors, INT’L. MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx
(last updated May 4, 2014).
269. See Tony Porter, Making the FSB Peer Review Effective, in THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD,
supra note 90, at 39, 40.
270. Id.
271. FSB Charter art. 16.
272. Id. art. 5(1).
273. Bessma Momani & Eric Helleiner, Financial Stability Board: The Arduous Road to Mission
Accomplished, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (May 18, 2012), http://www.cigionline.org/
publications/2012/5/financial-stability-board-arduous-road-mission-accomplished (“The FSB’s
capacity to support extensive peer reviews has been constrained by the very limited size of its
staff . . . .”).
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for major economies like those of the United States and Europe to
discipline wayward members within the political confines of the
G-20.
Much more could be done as well to tether the activities of the FSB
and the standard-setting bodies to national mechanisms of account-
ability, transparency, and legitimization.274 International standard-
setting already contemplates national methods of execution. In both
the United States and Europe, for example, this involves forms of
notice-and-comment rule-making, albeit with different procedures,
standards, and to some extent, expectations regarding the modes of
engaging public voice and fostering transparency. These national (or
in the case of the European Union, supranational) administrative
processes should be seen as part of a transnational, nested set of
systems to enhance the legitimacy and accountability of the global
financial regulatory architecture.
These national systems could be further bolstered by facilitating
public input into the decisions of national finance ministries and
regulators before they agree to global standards, akin to a kind of
“advance notice of proposed rulemaking” for the global negotiating
space. National mechanisms could also make greater space for trans-
parent, open mechanisms for civil-society organizations to provide
input into national decision-making prior to finalizing (or in some
instances, entering into) negotiations over key global-reform initia-
tives. While these national mechanisms to promote civil engagement
and enhance transparency will not automatically guarantee better
substantive outcomes, they may help bolster the case that the ultimate
judgments of the FSB and the standard-setting bodies, as well as the
ultimate implementation decisions of national regulatory authorities,
are legitimate.
Beyond national mechanisms, reforms should focus on the relation-
ship among the FSB, standard-setting bodies, and three other pillars of
global economic governance: the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. Here,
an expanded secretariat would also prove helpful, increasing the FSB’s
surveillance and policymaking capacities and making it more difficult
for the standard-setting bodies to evade board oversight. As to the IMF,
however, reform is not possible without direct intervention by the G-20,
as tensions between the IMF and FSB raise issues that are fundamental
to the global financial architecture: the division of labor between
apex-level bodies like the FSB, World Bank, and IMF; the relationship
274. See Barr & Miller, supra note 1, at 28-31.
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between the G-20, the institutions it oversees directly, and the set of
institutions under the umbrella of the United Nations and ECOSOC;
and the long-term mission of the G-20 itself.
Like the FSB, the G-20 might benefit from some degree of in-
creased institutionalization.275 It would ideally become more trans-
parent and increase its communication and collaboration with other
global bodies, including the IMF, World Bank, and United Nations.276
The G-20 has taken some steps in this direction, engaging in more
consultation with regional bodies and strengthening its own peer
review mechanisms.277 At some point, it may also make sense for the
G-20 to adopt a formal charter and staff a small secretariat.278 For
now, however, there is good reason to be cautious about further
hardening: the G-20 depends on the political commitments of its
national members, and maintaining its coalition requires substantial
strategic and operational flexibility. Furthermore, the national varia-
tion that has emerged in the absence of a more institutionalized G-20
has, at least to date, resulted in a much stronger set of cross-border
financial rules.
Instead, any G-20 reforms—and any subsequent rationalization of
the international regulatory order—depend on the G-20’s clarifying
and refining its own mission. Until the G-20 begins to develop blue-
prints for the post-crisis, post-response institutional architecture, the
current web of organizational relationships among the FSB, standard-
setting bodies, and Bretton Woods institutions will remain ad hoc. On
the one hand, this lack of clarity produces important institutional
experimentation;279 it helps surface tensions and concerns and can
inform subsequent architectural refinements.280 On the other, it com-
promises institutional efficacy and incentivizes delay in national compli-
275. See Nancy Alexander, G20 Governance, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE & IMPACT
REPORT 2013, supra note 244, at 20, 20-24 (proposing a variety of G20 reforms). But see Truman,
supra note 94, at 17-18.
276. See Alexander, supra note 275.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See Romano, supra note 242, at 35-38 (arguing for more flexibility and experimentation
in the international regulatory architecture).
280. See Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 64, at 88 (“[I]mprecision, as with nonbinding
agreements, can lead to more cooperation . . . .”); id. (“[E]vidence abounds that hierarchical
legal forms are impractical and that they undercut the experimentation and learning that are
crucial in the early stages of developing useful law around cooperation problems; the best
solutions are typically difficult to identify at the outset.”).
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ance and implementation.281 Thus, particularly as the major econo-
mies complete implementation of the G-20’s post-crisis agenda, the
most sensible reform is for the G-20 to begin thinking about what a role
beyond crisis management might look like and how its mission and
institutional design may need to be augmented in order to accommo-
date the broader task of long-term governance.
IV. CONCLUSION
The global financial regulatory architecture has evolved significantly
since 1944. The first set of global regulatory institutions—the IMF, the
World Bank, and the trade regime eventually embodied in the WTO—
while concerned with key problems in international money, paid scant
attention to the problem of global, cross-border supervision and regula-
tion of financial firms and markets. This institutional lacuna gave rise
to the networks—informal, bureaucratic standard-setting bodies—that
initially caused significant concerns about legitimacy and account-
ability but that eventually began to develop nascent mechanisms of
global administrative law.282 The rules these institutions produced,
however, did not work, to say the least, as the most recent financial
crisis revealed. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, the political
leaders of the leading global economies asserted themselves more
forcefully, producing a new set of institutions and institutional relation-
ships that were more formal, more political, and more hierarchical.
Although significant tensions still exist within this new system—
particularly as among national variation, extraterritorial application of
national rules, and the desire for uniform global standards—the sub-
stantive outcomes to date, while imperfect, messy, and contentious,
evidence a stronger commitment to meaningful, long-lasting reforms.
There is still much more substantive work to do—on capital and
liquidity, resolution, and derivatives, to name a few core areas in need
of action. In fact, such an approach is essential to reduce the chances of
another devastating global financial crisis. On bank resolution, the
United States has a solid framework in place but is still working through
how to make winding down a major financial firm plausible; in Europe,
there is agreement on the need for resolution authority but a lot more
to do to make this authority work within the context of E.U. member
281. See id. at 74 (“One of the challenges . . . is to obtain the advantages of flexibility while
still sending credible signals. Imprecision and other forms of flexibility must not be so elastic that
states misinterpret short-term variations in behavior as long-run deviations from compliance.”).
282. See Barr & Miller, supra note 1.
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states’ legal and political frameworks, and structural reform proposals
remain divisive. On derivatives, there is now general agreement on how
to approach trading, clearing, and transparency, but much more work
to do on capital requirements, margin requirements, clearinghouse
supervision, global coordination on trade repositories, determination
of equivalency across national borders, and other issues. Wholesale
funding mechanisms, including repo transactions and securities-
financing transactions, remain a source of risk in the system. Capital
rules are taking shape, but a final agreement on liquidity and leverage
must still be worked out, capital standards for the largest firms are still
too low, and transparent, comparable, and tough stress testing in
Europe and the United States, as well as consistent implementation of
risk-based rules globally, will be critical going forward.
Ultimately, the strength of these reforms cannot be judged absent
the next crisis. But if the post-crisis reforms are to endure, the system
must shift from the task of emergency response to the project of
governance, a project that will require more institutional clarity, and
more sensitivity to the concerns of legitimacy and accountability, both
globally and nationally. Conceptually “easy” answers—a treaty-based
World Financial Organization, centralized adjudication, a global finan-
cial supervisor, and resolution authority, to name a few—are neither
politically feasible nor normatively desirable. Instead, we are left with a
messier, more iterative, less satisfying, but more realistic task: to con-
tinue to make progress on making the global financial system safer,
fairer, and, one would hope, more focused on meeting the pressing
needs of households and business in the real economy.
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